Cognitivist and Emergent Cognition - An Alternative Perspective

  • Michael James Gratton
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7999)

Abstract

A new perspective on classifying cognitive systems is presented in which a distinction is made based on how the world is represented, rather than the typical distinction between cognitivist and emergent approaches. It is argued that the typical classification in essence distinguishes between systems by their implementation, rather than by their properties. The alternative presented here instead focuses on how the system represents the world (if at all) and whether these representations are intelligible to the designer or the system itself. From this novel angle, existing systems are better classified and importantly a gap in existing cognitive systems research becomes evident. An outline of a well-founded cognitive system that fills this space is put forward, one which cognitive robotics is ideally situated to explore.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael James Gratton
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and EngineeringThe University of New South WalesAustralia

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