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Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System

  • Filip Zagórski
  • Richard T. Carback
  • David Chaum
  • Jeremy Clark
  • Aleksander Essex
  • Poorvi L. Vora
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7954)

Abstract

We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software, or a corrupt election authority—two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.

Keywords

Dispute Resolution Vote System Polling Place Valid Code Municipal Election 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Filip Zagórski
    • 1
  • Richard T. Carback
    • 2
  • David Chaum
    • 3
  • Jeremy Clark
    • 4
  • Aleksander Essex
    • 5
  • Poorvi L. Vora
    • 6
  1. 1.Wrocław University of TechnologyPoland
  2. 2.Draper LaboratoryUSA
  3. 3.Voting System InstituteUSA
  4. 4.Carleton UniversityCanada
  5. 5.Western UniversityCanada
  6. 6.The George Washington UniversityUSA

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