First-Class Labels: Using Information Flow to Debug Security Holes

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7904)


We present a system of first-class labels that assists web authors in assessing and diagnosing vulnerabilities in web applications, focusing their attention on flows of information specific to their application. Using first-class labels, web developers can directly manipulate labels and express security policies within JavaScript itself, leveraging their existing knowledge to improve the quality of their applications. Introducing first-class labels incurs no additional overhead over the implementation of information flow in a JavaScript Virtual Machine, making it suitable for use in a security testing environment even for applications that execute large amounts of JavaScript code.


Information Leak Label System Supporting Framework Monitor Function Document Object Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CaliforniaIrvineUSA

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