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Privacy-Preserving Multi-party Reconciliation Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

  • Florian Weingarten
  • Georg Neugebauer
  • Ulrike Meyer
  • Susanne Wetzel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7873)

Abstract

Fully homomorphic cryptosystems allow the evaluation of arbitrary Boolean circuits on encrypted inputs and therefore have very important applications in the area of secure multi-party computation. Since every computable function can be expressed as a Boolean circuit, it is theoretically clear how to achieve function evaluation on encrypted inputs. However, the transformation to Boolean circuits is not trivial in practice. In this work, we design such a transformation for certain functions, i.e., we propose algorithms and protocols which make use of fully homomorphic encryption in order to achieve privacy-preserving multi-party reconciliation on ordered sets. Assuming a sufficiently efficient encryption scheme, our solution performs much better than existing approaches in terms of communication overhead and number of homomorphic operations.

Keywords

privacy secure group computation cryptographic protocols multi-party reconciliation protocols fully homomorphic encryption 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Florian Weingarten
    • 1
  • Georg Neugebauer
    • 1
  • Ulrike Meyer
    • 1
  • Susanne Wetzel
    • 2
  1. 1.LuFG IT-Security, UMIC Research CentreRWTH Aachen UniversityAachenGermany
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceStevens Institute of TechnologyUSA

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