Timing Attacks against the Syndrome Inversion in Code-Based Cryptosystems

  • Falko Strenzke
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7932)

Abstract

In this work we present the first practical key-aimed timing attack against code-based cryptosystems. It arises from vulnerabilities that are present in the inversion of the error syndrome through the Extended Euclidean Algorithm that is part of the decryption operation of these schemes. Three types of timing vulnerabilities are combined to a successful attack. Each is used to gain information about the secret support, which is part of code-based decryption keys: The first allows recovery of the zero-element, the second is a refinement of a previously described vulnerability yielding linear equations, and the third enables to retrieve cubic equations.

Keywords

side channel attack timing attack post quantum cryptography code-based cryptography 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Falko Strenzke
    • 1
  1. 1.Cryptography and Computeralgebra, Department of Computer ScienceTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany

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