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RCCA Security for KEM+DEM Style Hybrid Encryptions

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Book cover Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7763))

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Abstract

RCCA security is a weaker notion than CCA security, and has been proven to be sufficient for several cryptographic tasks. This paper adapts RCCA security to the most popular hybrid paradigms, KEM+DEM and Tag-KEM/DEM.

It is open to construct an RCCA-secure scheme more efficient than CCA-secure ones. In the setting of Tag-KEM, we solve this by presenting a natural RCCA-secure RSA-based Tag-KEM scheme, named as RSA-TKEM, which is more efficient than all existing methods for constructing a CCA-secure RSA-based Tag-KEM scheme.

Unfortunately, combining our RSA-TKEM with passive secure one-time pad following Tag-KEM/DEM paradigm yields an RCCA-insecure hybrid encryption. This shows passive security of DEM is not sufficient now, and Tag-KEM/DEM looses its advantage over KEM+DEM. In spite of this and for completeness, we show RCCA secure DEMs are still sufficient to achieve RCCA-secure hybrid encryptions by following Tag-KEM/DEM.

In addition, we show RCCA-secure KEM is sufficient for achieving CCA-secure hybrid encryptions. This is done by introducing a new hybrid paradigm, named as KEM/Tag-DEM, where the ciphertext of KEM is used as a tag for Tag-DEM scheme rather than reversely in Tag-KEM/DEM, so that the security of KEM can be weakened to RCCA one. Tag-DEMs can be constructed as efficiently as DEMs, so RCCA-secure KEMs more efficient than CCA-secure ones become more appealing.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks (ISN), Xidian University, Xi’an, 710071, P.R. China

    Yuan Chen & Qingkuan Dong

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  1. Yuan Chen
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  2. Qingkuan Dong
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Fundamental Problems of Technology, Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370, Wrocław, Poland

    Mirosław Kutyłowski

  2. Computer Science Department, Columbia University and Google Inc., Amsterdam Avenue 1214, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

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Chen, Y., Dong, Q. (2013). RCCA Security for KEM+DEM Style Hybrid Encryptions. In: Kutyłowski, M., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7763. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38519-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38519-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38518-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38519-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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