Abstract
Based on the Principal-Agent theory, combined with characteristics of China’s state-owned coal enterprise industry and the managers, through the introduction of manager capacity level, managers’ external degree of efforts and the output brought by uncertainty, established a principal-agent model, analyzing quantitatively and further discussing incentive problem of managers of the state-owned coal enterprise. At last, based on the actual situation, this article put forward the suggestion: establish a system for investors of state assets, establish long-term incentive mechanism, play the law supervision and restraint function, and establish and develop manager market and so on for the formulation and implementation of state-owned coal enterprise manager’s incentive strategy.
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Xing, Ay., Wang, Gh. (2013). Research on the Incentive Mechanism of the State-Owned Coal Enterprise Managers Based on the Principal-Agent Theory. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_46
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_46
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