Abstract
Generic side-channel distinguishers aim at revealing the correct key embedded in cryptographic modules even when few assumptions can be made about their physical leakages. In this context, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Analysis (KSA) and Partial Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis (PKS) were proposed respectively. Although both KSA and PKS are based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, they really differ a lot from each other in terms of construction strategies. Inspired by this, we construct nine new variants by combining their strategies in a systematic way. Furthermore, we explore the effectiveness and efficiency of all these twelve KS test based distinguishers under various simulated scenarios in a univariate setting within a unified comparison framework, and also investigate how these distinguishers behave in practical scenarios. For these purposes, we perform a series of attacks against both simulated traces and real traces. Success Rate (SR) is used to measure the efficiency of key recovery attacks in our evaluation. Our experimental results not only show how to choose the most suitable KS test based distinguisher in a particular scenario, but also clarify the practical meaning of all these KS test based distinguishers in practice.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential Power Analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Messerges, T.S., Dabbish, E.A., Sloan, R.H.: Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks. IEEE Trans. Comput. 51(5), 541–552 (2002)
Brier, E., Clavier, C., Olivier, F.: Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model. In: Joye, M., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) CHES 2004. LNCS, vol. 3156, pp. 16–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Le, T.-H., Clédière, J., Canovas, C., Robisson, B., Servière, C., Lacoume, J.-L.: A Proposition for Correlation Power Analysis Enhancement. In: Goubin, L., Matsui, M. (eds.) CHES 2006. LNCS, vol. 4249, pp. 174–186. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Mangard, S., Oswald, E., Standaert, F.-X.: All for one-one for all: Unifying univariate DPA attacks. IET Information Security 5(2), 100–110 (2011)
Doget, J., Prouff, E., Rivain, M., Standaert, F.-X.: Univariate side channel attacks and leakage modeling. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 1(2), 123–144 (2011)
Gierlichs, B., Batina, L., Tuyls, P., Preneel, B.: Mutual Information Analysis: A Generic Side-Channel Distinguisher. In: Oswald, E., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CHES 2008. LNCS, vol. 5154, pp. 426–442. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Moon, Y.-I., Rajagopalan, B., Lall, U.: Estimation of Mutual Information using Kernal Density Estimators. Physical Review E 52, 2318–2321 (1995)
Walters-Williams, J., Li, Y.: Estimation of mutual information: A survey. In: Wen, P., Li, Y., Polkowski, L., Yao, Y., Tsumoto, S., Wang, G. (eds.) RSKT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5589, pp. 389–396. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Veyrat-Charvillon, N., Standaert, F.-X.: Mutual Information Analysis: How, When and Why? In: Clavier, C., Gaj, K. (eds.) CHES 2009. LNCS, vol. 5747, pp. 429–443. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Batina, L., Gierlichs, B., Prouff, E., Rivain, M., Standaert, F.-X., Veyrat-Charvillon, N.: Mutual Information Analysis: A Comprehensive Study. Journal of Cryptology 24(2), 269–291 (2011)
Whitnall, C., Oswald, E., Mather, L.: An Exploration of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test as Competitor to Mutual Information Analysis. In: Prouff, E. (ed.) CARDIS 2011. LNCS, vol. 7079, pp. 234–251. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Liu, J.-Y., Zhou, Y.-B., Yang, S.-G., Feng, D.-G.: Generic Side-Channel Distinguisher Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test: Explicit Contruction and Practical Evaluation. Chinese Journal of Electronics 21(3), 547–553 (2012)
Whitnall, C., Oswald, E.: A Fair Evaluation Framework for Comparing Side-Channel Distinguishers. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 1(2), 145–160 (2011)
Standaert, F.-X., Malkin, T.G., Yung, M.: A unified framework for the analysis of side-channel key recovery attacks. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 443–461. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Standaert, F.-X., Gierlichs, B., Verbauwhede, I.: Partition vs. Comparison Side-Channel Distinguishers: An Empirical Evaluation of Statistical Tests for Univariate Side-Channel Attacks against Two Unprotected CMOS Devices. In: Lee, P.J., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ICISC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5461, pp. 253–267. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Zhao, H., Zhou, Y., Standaert, FX., Zhang, H. (2013). Systematic Construction and Comprehensive Evaluation of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Based Side-Channel Distinguishers. In: Deng, R.H., Feng, T. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7863. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38033-4_24
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38033-4_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38032-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38033-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)