Segregation and the Evolution of Cooperation

Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 214)


Thirty years have passed since Robert Axelrod and William Hamilton published their influential contribution to the problem of cooperation. They showed, with the help of both an experiment and analytical techniques, that cooperation is the most likely evolutionary outcome of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game when individuals interact repeatedly. Building on Hamilton’s earlier work they also demonstrated that, when pairing of individual is not completely random, cooperating behavior can evolve in a world initially dominated by defectors. In this paper, Computer simulations are used to study the relation between non-random pairing and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. We conclude that cooperation can survive also when the possibility of repeated interaction and reciprocity is ruled out.


Segregated interaction Cooperation Evolution 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceVestfold University CollegeBorreNorway
  2. 2.Department of Business and ManagementVestfold University CollegeBorreNorway

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