Skip to main content

The Evolution of the Concept of ‘Management Control’: Towards a Definition of ‘Performance Management System’

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover Performance Management Systems

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

Organizational control can be analysed according to different perspectives. Economic, social, psychological and behavioural theories of control will be critically discussed in order to provide a multifaceted concept of control in economic organizations. In this theoretical framework, management control scholars developed several approaches. Starting from the 60s, academics reached a consensus on cybernetic approaches to management control. Later on, in the 70s and 80s more behavioural and social studies appeared in the field. In the 90s a call for a ‘revolution’ in the management control literature arose, thus more and more research ‘extended the boundaries’ of management control and focussed on both financial and non-financial issues. From this revolutionary approach, the management control field evolved in the performance management one, where the emphasis on control has reduced, while the one on performance increased. At the end of the Chapter, an Italian perspective on management control introduces and discusses different schools of thoughts and highlights different academic views.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Nonetheless there is a very high variety of organizational control definitions; at this stage, a general definition has been proposed. For a comprehensive review of organizational control literature see Chandler (1962, 1977).

  2. 2.

    Tannenbaum defined the alignment between individual actions/goals to organizational ones as conformity (Tannenbaum 1962: 238). This term implies a twofold meaning. First, individuals should adjust their personal actions/goals so that these align with the organizational ones. Second, individuals perceiving a mismatch between their personal goals and the organizational ones, do not self-select themselves to be part of that organization. Tannenbaum’s work seems to be more closely related to the first meaning of conformity, in that he analysed the different behavioural responses individuals give in order to conform to different types of controls.

  3. 3.

    Cyert and March start their reasoning about the conflict between individual and organizational objectives by assuming that “People (i.e. individuals) have goals; collectivities of people do not” (Cyert and March 1963: 26). After that, they outline three main ways in which the goal formation process works. The first one is the bargaining process, in which the handling of side payments drives the definition of general terms and conditions for organizational goal identification and achievement. The second one is related to the stabilization and elaboration of objectives through budgetary control, functions allocation, and organizational memory building. The last one is the change in objectives through experience that relates to the shift in the attention focus between two or more conflicting objectives, when one of them occurs in a drastic experience.

  4. 4.

    According to Anthony, economic theories influenced what he called “operational control” (Anthony 1965: 93).

  5. 5.

    Cournot developed the duopoly competition theory (Cournot 1838), while Chamberlin put forward the monopolistic competition theory (1933). Robinson introduced monopsony competition (Robinson 1933) and von Stackelberg addressed a type of duopoly, i.e. the Stackelberg leadership model (von Stackelberg 1934).

  6. 6.

    According to Fama, the separation of ownership and control is “an efficient form of economic organisation within the “set of contract” perspective” (Fama 1980: 289). Entrepreneur develops both the management and the risk-bearing function. While competition stresses for the implementation of devices for “efficiently monitoring” all employees’ performance, the latter (employees) experience incentives for serving both the firm they are employed for and external stimuli.

  7. 7.

    For a deeper analysis on the incentive and rewarding mechanism see also Chap. 10.

  8. 8.

    As there is no absolute solution to the owner-manger conflict, the principal-agent theory is also called the managerial theory of the firm (Hart 1989: 1759).

  9. 9.

    Transaction cost theory is closely related to agency theory, in that both emphasise the limits of market transactions related to information asymmetries among economic agents (Kaplan 1984).

  10. 10.

    Evan asserted that compliance “has a cognitive and motivational component” since “subordinates must understand what they are supposed to do and they must be willing to do it” (Evans 1975: 252).

  11. 11.

    On the hierarchy of needs, see Maslow (1970).

  12. 12.

    Arrow gives the example of an exchange between a physician and her/his patient, where “personal responsibility, or fidelity or trust” arises in the assessment of the fairness of the price of the exchange (Arrow 1964: 403).

  13. 13.

    Arrow argues that maximization should also consider some constraints: i.e., the demand for the commodity and the supply of input for producing the commodity. The optimum is determined according to the Lagrange method for constrained maxima and prices are given by Lagrange multipliers (Arrow 1964).

  14. 14.

    The typologies developed by Parsons are in stark contrast with the Weberian hierarchic approach to organizational structures (Weber 1968). In fact, Parsons argued that the pyramidal structure is too simple an approach to adopt (Hassard 1995).

  15. 15.

    Burns and Stalker named the two different management practices “mechanistic” and “organic”. The “mechanistic” system “appeared to be appropriate to an enterprise operating under relatively stable conditions. […] In mechanistic systems the problems and tasks are broken down into specialisms. Each individual pursues his task as something distinct from the real tasks of the concern as a whole”; on the other hand, “[o]rganic systems are adapted to unstable conditions, when problems and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and distributed among specialist roles […] Individuals have to perform their special task in the light of their knowledge of the tasks of the firm as a whole” (Lawrence and Lorsch 1969: 188).

  16. 16.

    Woodward identified three main techniques of production: small batch, large batch and continuous production. Each technique was assigned a scale of predictability, so that small batches resulted in low predictability while continuous production had high predictability (Woodward 1958).

  17. 17.

    Chandler controlled for environmental changes related to “technology, markets and source of supply” that enacted strategic and subsequently structural changes (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967: 198).

  18. 18.

    The strategies were related to “expansion of volume”, “growth through geographical dispersion”, and diversification through “new lines of products” (Chandler 1962: 16).

  19. 19.

    Three sectors were included in Lawrence and Lorsch’s study: a scientific, a market and a techno-economic one (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967: 29).

  20. 20.

    This statement seems to be influenced by the behavioural approach, whose scholars – such as Herbert Simon (1947) – introduced ten years before the Gouldner review.

  21. 21.

    In describing the ‘social categories of economic action’, Weber pointed out that “[r]ational economic action requires instrumental rationality in this orientation, that is, deliberate planning” (p. 63). He put forward that “[n]ot every type of action which is rational in its choice of means will be called ‘rational economic action’ […] in particular, the term ‘economy’ will be distinguished from that of ‘technique’ [… e]conomic action is primarily oriented to the problem of choosing the end to which a thing shall be applied; technology, to the problem, given the end, of choosing the appropriate means” (p. 65–67).

  22. 22.

    The superior’s dominance over subordinates is limited by both the specified sphere of competence, i.e., “jurisdisction” (p. 218), and higher order superiors who have control over their subordinates use of domination.

  23. 23.

    Monocratic bureaucracy refers to “the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization” (p. 223).

  24. 24.

    Weber stated that bureaucratic administration is superior to other types of administration in terms of “[p]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs” (p. 973).

  25. 25.

    Rules represent the source of knowledge of the bureaucratic administration – i.e., the source of its efficiency – and officials have to learn and manage them accordingly.

  26. 26.

    Dunnette’s Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (1973) owes its name to Division 14 of the American Psychological Association, and this is due to the fact that organizational psychology emerged as an independent discipline from industrial psychology (Bass 1965; Blackler and Shimmin 1984).

  27. 27.

    Organizational psychology has been defined as “the study of large scale organizations in their psychological and social aspects” (Quinn and Kahn 1967: 437), or “the study of how men at work are affected by the system of men, money, and materials within which they work. Also, it deals with how they, in turn, exert influence on the conversion of the inputs of human energy, money, and materials on the system’s manifold outputs of wealth, goods, and satisfaction” (Bass 1965: 33). Bass maintained that organizational psychology is connected with other disciplines, such as economics and the physical and behavioural sciences (Bass 1965).

  28. 28.

    On the concept of organization as a complex system, see Rice (1963) and Trist et al. (1963), who developed the so-called Tavistock Sociotechnical model; Homans (1950) and the model named after him; Likert (1961), who put forward the Likert overlapping-group model; Kahn et al. (1964), who introduced the Kahn overlapping-role-set model; and the contingency scholars (Galbraith 1969; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Woodward 1958), who introduced the contingency approach.

  29. 29.

    The concept of psychological contract has been defined as “the set of expectations about the nature of the exchange between the individual and the organization […]. Many of these expectations are implicit and unstated, but they act as powerful determinants of behaviour” (Blackler and Shimmin 1984: 17).

  30. 30.

    Organizational determinants are related to the degree of bureaucratisation, size, the hierarchical properties and goals (Bass 1965).

  31. 31.

    Interpersonal relations involve supervisory behaviour, power and authority (Quinn and Kahn 1967: 439).

  32. 32.

    In Quinn and Kahn’s analysis, responses relate to role behaviour and job satisfaction (Quinn and Kahn 1967: 439).

  33. 33.

    Organizational outcomes may be referred to productivity, absenteeism or turnover (Quinn and Kahn 1967: 439).

  34. 34.

    Personality can be analysed as either a constant for all individuals or a variable whose dimensions are organizational-dependent (Quinn and Kahn 1967: 451).

  35. 35.

    As stated by Simon “[t]he question is sometimes asked whether an analysis of organisations in terms of their decision-making processes is “sociological” or whether it is “psychological”. The question is a little bit odd […]. The correct answer in either case is “both”” (Simon 1976: XXXV).

  36. 36.

    Indeed, Margolis posited “[…] the traditionalist solution […] does not integrate into the main body of explanation of the non-profit-maximizing goals and business rules observed in practice which arise in part because of the existence of uncertainty” (Margolis 1958: 189). For some evidence of non-profit-maximising goals, see e.g. Rothschild (1947), who asserted that the entrepreneur is primarily interested in the firm’s long-run survival. In a similar vein, Baumol (1959) posited that the main objective of the firm is the maximisation of sales under a certain profit constraint. Gordon (1948), Simon (1947) and Margolis (1958) stressed that instead of maximising profit, managers tend to strive for ‘satisfactory profit’. Other organizational objectives relate to market share (Lanzillotti 1958), managers’ personal objectives (Scitovsky 1943), social responsibility (Freeman 1984), security, autonomy and growth (Galbraith 1967), growth and expansion goals (Penrose 1959).

  37. 37.

    According to Simon, rationality can be defined as “the selection of preferred behaviour alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the consequences of behaviour can be evaluated” (p. 75). Also, he advised using the term rationality “in conjunction with appropriate adverbs” such as objective (vs. subjective) rationality, or personal (vs. organizational) rationality (p. 76).

  38. 38.

    Simon clarified that he used the term rational in the “goal-oriented” meaning (p.3).

  39. 39.

    Simons asserted that “[o]n the one side, the individual is limited by those skills, habits and reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the conscious […]. On a second side, the individual is limited by his value and those conceptions of purpose which influence him in making his decisions. […] On a third side, the individual is limited by the extent of his knowledge of things relevant to his job” (p. 40).

  40. 40.

    In Simon’s work, attention has been defined as “the set of elements that enter into consciousness at any given time” (p. 90).

  41. 41.

    Following the same reasoning, Papandreou asserted that substantive planning involves constructing the firm’s budget, while procedural planning is related to the communication and authority system (Papandreou 1952).

  42. 42.

    In Cyert and March’s study, multiple goals relates to the need to identify and manage more than a single objective at a time; the changing goals approach is consistent with the learning from experience that leads to the adjustment of objectives as soon as the related aspiration-level changes; finally, goals are set at an aspirational-level because the maximisation principle has been substituted by the “satisfying principle”; i.e., “a level of aspiration that the firm uses to evaluate alternative policies” (Cyert and March 1963: 10). In a similar vein, Margolis defined the aspiration level, asserting that “at least two conditions hold for aspiration level: (1) it must be high enough to assure the long-run survival of the firm […] and (2) the aspiration level for future periods must be equal to or greater than current normal profits” (Margolis 1958: 190).

  43. 43.

    Anthony stressed that social psychology is the source discipline of “management control” (Anthony 1965).

  44. 44.

    Even though many scholars acknowledge that the roots of control within organizations lie in the work of Taylor (Miller and O’Leary 1987), previous studies, such as those by Babbage (1832) and Fink (1874), have been identified as addressing “innovations which led directly to twenty-first-century processes of management control” (Otley et al. 1995: S34).

  45. 45.

    As Reeves and Woodward clearly pointed out “In the literature relating to organizational behaviour there is ambiguity in the use of the word control. The confusion arises largely because to control can also mean to direct. Precisely defined control refers solely to the task of ensuring that activities are producing the desired results. Control in this sense is limited to monitoring the outcome of activities, reviewing feedback information about this outcome, and if necessary taking corrective actions” (Reeves and Woodward 1970: 38). Also, Lowe and Machin stressed that the definition of management control “leaves scope for academics to disagree violently, whilst still perceiving themselves to be studying the same thing!” (Lowe and Machin 1983).

  46. 46.

    One of the first studies that tried to set forth some principles of control was by Urwick, who introduced three – even though in a previous study responsibility and evidence principles were also concerned (Urwick 1928) – principles of control: “uniformity”, i.e., all figures should be related to the overall organizational structure; “comparison” with standards and previous performance; and “utility”, all figures vary in the value they had when facts happened and the one they had when they are recorded (Urwick 1943: 122).

  47. 47.

    Some of these techniques relate to standard setting, the recording of results and directions (Emerson 1912).

  48. 48.

    In Church’s words, control is “that function which coordinates all of the other functions and in addition supervises their work” (Church 1914: 81); while Fayol defined it as “verifying whether everything occurs in conformity with the plan adopted, the instructions issued and principles established” (Fayol 1949: 107).

  49. 49.

    Some initial studies on the relationship between control and planning are those by Holden et al. (1941) and Rowland (1947).

  50. 50.

    One of the well-known techniques to assess planned and actual performance is variation analysis.

  51. 51.

    Some scholars showed their concern about the “poverty of management control philosophy” (Hofstede 1978).

  52. 52.

    Otley and his colleagues defined the work of Anthony and colleagues (1992) as the “mainstream” approach, adding that it “can perhaps be credited with the first contemporary attempts to formalise the subject area of management control” (Otley et al. 1995: 17).

  53. 53.

    Anthony stated that “[i]t is important to distinguish between “systems” and “processes.” In brief, a system facilitates a process; it is the means by which the process occurs”. He continues by saying “we are interested in both in terms of how it works” (Anthony 1965: 5).

  54. 54.

    Previous studies argued that predictive models use a type of variable that is “outside the scope of the accounting structure” since such models require information that are related to the external environment and difficult to measure objectively (Otley and Berry 1980: 234).

  55. 55.

    This definition is related to the concept of personnel control that, together with action control and results control, defines the organization’s controls. Merchant’s results control relates to people’s responsibility for attaining target results. Action control is more concerned with people carrying out proper actions instead of non-proper ones (Merchant 1985). Some scholars stressed that output control is more efficient than behaviour-action control in large organizations (Blau and Scott 1962; Evans 1975; Williamson 1971), while others maintained that, in order to enhance effectiveness, both controls should be performed within the organization (Berry et al. 1995; Ouchi 1977).

  56. 56.

    Among the literature that relates control to power, see e.g. Tannenbaum (1962). Other scholars diverged from this view of control as power by insisting that control is the “exercise of legitimate authority rather than power” (Otley et al. 1995: S33).

  57. 57.

    For a summary of historical developments in cost accounting, see Kaplan (1983, 1984).

  58. 58.

    Similarly, Lebas posited that “measuring parameters descriptive of performance makes sense only if the data are to be used in making decisions” (Lebas 1992: 65).

  59. 59.

    Armstrong follows this approach by stressing that performance management is “a systematic process for improving organizational performance by developing the performance of individuals and teams” (Armstrong 2006: 1).

  60. 60.

    Although previous works in the Italian accounting literature involve the “surveillance” as one of the accounting discipline’s “superior functions” (e.g. G. Rossi 1921: 233), the control activity is no more specified and explained (Giannessi 1964).

  61. 61.

    Together with the economic control, management (“gestione”) and leadership (“direzione”) form the three momenti of economic administration (Besta 1922).

  62. 62.

    Furthermore, Amaduzzi asserted that there is no difference, neither in finality nor in content, between recording and constraining, hence accounting and management control are overlapping in Amaduzzi’s approach (Amaduzzi 1963: 455–ff.). This approach seems to address a very extensive concept of accounting, covering other disciplines such as organisation, management, as well as psychology, which are closely related to management control. Besta’s approach develops a more coherent relationship between recording and constraining, namely that of means to an end (Mondini 1898: 17).

  63. 63.

    From a different standpoint, Giovanni Rossi argued that on the one hand control is only a part of the accounting discipline, while on the other economic control is made up of two components, that is recording and administrative constraining, that are conceptually heterogeneous, hence they can’t belong to the same discipline (Rossi 1922: 246; Giannessi 1964). A similar point of view is that of Achille Sanguinetti (1903).

  64. 64.

    Planning, i.e. antecedent control in Besta’s terms, is composed of both partial (or single) forecasts, and general forecasts (Besta 1922, Vol. I: 115).

  65. 65.

    Napoleone Rossi put forward that planning should be conveniently translated into a “planned balance sheet” (Rossi 1966: 165; translated from the original), or “budget” which is “made up of operational plans for each sector of the business” (p. 165). The Author stressed the importance to test the feasibility of the budget “a priori”, i.e. in advance (p. 168). On the same vein, Maria Bergamin Barbato addressed budgeting as a “crucial” step, when it is related to strategic planning (Bergamin Barbato 1992: 10).

  66. 66.

    Alfieri stressed that the Anglo-Saxon literature on organisational control came from Besta’s approach to accounting and from his definition of economic organisation (Alfieri 1923).

  67. 67.

    Gino Zappa defined an “azienda” as an “economic coordination in action, constituted and run for the satisfaction of the human needs through the production of goods and services” (Zappa 1927: 30; translated from the original).

  68. 68.

    Similarly, Ferdinando Di Fenizio put forward that general, overall planning can be termed “programmazione”, i.e. planning, while the economic documents encompassing planning principles, is a “programma”, i.e. a plan (Di Fenizio 1963: 14).

  69. 69.

    A slightly different taxonomy of antecedent control, or planning, has been introduced by Lino Azzini, who defined long-range plans (“piani di lungo periodo”) the result of planning activity, while defined-range plans (“piani di periodo definito”) relates to either annual or more than annual plans, particular plans (“piani particolari”) when related to sub-systems of different kind, activities, and so forth, finally forecast accounts (“conti di previsione”) relate to elemental activities, or process stages (Azzini 1982: 363-ff.).

  70. 70.

    From a similar perspective, Pellegrino Capaldo asserted that planning is both a “continua”, i.e. ongoing, and a “sistematica”, i.e. systematic, forecasting activity. The ongoing characteristic refers to the urge of continuously check for a fit between internal forecasts and environmental change. The systematic feature is related to the need to coordinate forecasts between all organisational dimensions (Capaldo 1965: 38). On the effectiveness of planning, Fortunati and Matacena stressed that planning should be “strategic”, “quantitative”, “global”, as well as “flexible and ongoing” (Fortunati and Matacena 1997: 34–ff.).

  71. 71.

    A comprehensive discipline such as economia aziendale has been introduced in the Anglo-Saxon literature with the strategic management accounting approach (see in this work § 2.4; Siboni 2005: Chap. 2).

  72. 72.

    Similarly, Capaldo (1965), Fortunati and Matacena (1977), Guarini (1966), and Superti Furga (1969). The latter defined programming as “expected actions that should be accomplished”, while the programme is “the projection in the future of the administrative activity” which “has been determined through the flow of administrative decisions” (Superti Furga 1969: 26; translated from the original). Control, instead, is an “operational decision that follows the remarking of deviations related to different actual either internal or external conditions compared to hypotheses founding the programme” (p. 27).

  73. 73.

    Although statistical methodologies support decision-making, decision-makers’ bounded rationality limits their effectiveness (Sciarelli 1967).

  74. 74.

    Organisational values define the organisational culture, since it is the “set of values shared by management, which provide cohesion within and an image towards the outside of the firm” (Cescon 1988: 13; translated from the original).

  75. 75.

    Reducing risk is one of the functions of the interactive control system in Robert Simons’ framework, which identifies “strategic uncertainties”, i.e. “uncertainties and contingencies that cloud threaten or invalidate the current strategy of the business” (Simons 1995: 94).

  76. 76.

    For additional insights into the fit between performance management systems and the environment, see Chap. 12 of this work.

  77. 77.

    Onida posited that both economic and “moral” rewards can promote employees’ productivity. Furthermore, he addressed negative rewards, i.e. punishments, as a form of disincentive to low productivity, as well as thefts of securities (Onida 1950: 136–137).

  78. 78.

    Brusa highlighted the stages of strategic planning, which are (Brusa and Zamprogna 1991: 17):

    • Analysis of the “macro” scenario;

    • Setting of long-term objectives;

    • Setting of organisational “rules of behaviour”;

    • Identifying businesses and related choices;

    • Analysis of the business’ competitive profile;

    • Identifying business’ strategic alternatives;

    • Formulating portfolio strategy;

    • Operative planning.

  79. 79.

    The systematic literature review provided only forty performance measurement studies (compared to the more than two hundred for performance measurement), which contained “performance management” in their title.

  80. 80.

    Concept specification is “the process whereby fuzzy and imprecise notions of constructs are made more specific and precise” (Bisbe et al. 2007: 790).

  81. 81.

    Only 30 % of the papers reviewed explicitly define or refer to other authors’ definitions of the terms performance measurement or performance management.

References

  • Abernethy MA, Chua WF (1996) A field study of control system “Redesign”: the impact of institutional processes on strategic choice. Contemp Account Res 13(2):569–606

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchian AA (1950) Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. J Polit Econ 58:211–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchian AA, Demsetz H (1972) Production, information costs, and economic organization. Am Econ Rev Am Econ Assoc 62(5):777–795

    Google Scholar 

  • Alfieri V (1923) Le rilevazioni amministrative. Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria, Roma

    Google Scholar 

  • Amaduzzi A (1963) L’azienda nel suo sistema e nell’ordine delle sue rilevazioni, vol I. UTET, Torino

    Google Scholar 

  • Amaratunga D, Baldry D (2002) Moving from performance measurement to performance management. Facilities 20(5/6):217–223

    Google Scholar 

  • Amigoni F (1984) The administrative function: structures, positions and professional skills. Economia Aziendale Four Mon Rev, III(1):1–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Anthony RN (1965) Planning and control systems: a framework for analysis. Harvard Business School Division of Research, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Anthony RN, Dearden J, Govindarajan V (1992) Management control systems. Irwin, Homewood

    Google Scholar 

  • Argyris C (1952) The impact of budgets upon people. Controllership Foundation, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong M (2006) A handbook of management techniques: a comprehensive guide to achieving managerial excellence and improved decision making. Kogan Page, London/Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow KJ (1964) Control in large organizations. Manag Sci 10(3):397–408

    Google Scholar 

  • Ashby WR (1956) An introduction to cybernetics. Chapman & Hall, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson AA (1998) Strategic performance measurement and incentive compensation. Europ Manag J 16(6):552–561

    Google Scholar 

  • Azzini L (1982) Istituzioni di economia d’azienda. Giuffrè, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Babbage C (1832) On the economy of machinery and manufactures. Charles Knight, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Barnard CI (1940) The nature of leadership. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Bass BM (1965) Organizational psychology. Allyn and Bacon, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol WJ (1959) Business behavior, value and growth. Macmillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Beer SA (1972) Brain of the firm. Allen Lane, The Penguin Press/Herder and Herder, London/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Beer SA (1979) The heart of enterprise. Wiley, London/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Beer SA (1981) Brain of the firm, 2nd edn. Wiley, London/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Beer SA (1985) Diagnosing the system for organizations. Wiley, London/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergamin Barbato M (1992) Il controllo di gestione nelle imprese italiane. Progettazione, funzionamento e processi di adeguamento. Con floppy disk. ETAS, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Berry AJ, Broadbent JM, Otley DT (1995) Research in management control: an overview of its development. Brit J Manag 6:S31–S34

    Google Scholar 

  • Besta F (1922) La ragioneria. Vallardi, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Bihimani A (2009) Risk management, corporate governance and management accounting: emerging interdependencies. Editorial Manage Account Res 20:2–5

    Google Scholar 

  • Bisbe J, Batista-Foguet J-M, Chenhall R (2007) Defining management accounting constructs: a methodological note on the risks of conceptual misspecification. Account Org Soc 32:789–820

    Google Scholar 

  • Bititci US, Carrie AS, McDevitt LG (1997) Integrated performance measurement systems: a development guide. Int J Oper Prod Manag 17(6):522–535

    Google Scholar 

  • Bititci US, Turner T, Begemann C (2000) Dynamics of performance measurement systems. Int J Oper Prod Manag 20(6):692–704

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackler FHM, Shimmin S (1984) Applying psychology in organizations. Methuen, London/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Blau PM (1965) The comparative study of organizations. Ind Labor Relat Rev 18(3):323–338

    Google Scholar 

  • Blau PM, Schoenherr RA (1971) The structure of organizations. Basic, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Blau PM, Scott WR (1962) Formal organizations: a comparative approach. Chandler, San Francisco

    Google Scholar 

  • Bromwich M (1990) The case for strategic management accounting, the role for accounting information for strategy in competitive markets. Account Org Soc 15(1/2):27–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Brunetti G (1979) Il controllo di gestione in condizioni ambientali perturbate. FrancoAngeli, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Brusa L, Zamprogna L (1991) Pianificazione e controllo di gestione. Etas Libri, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns T, Stalker GM (1961) The management of innovation. Tavistock, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Burrell G, Morgan G (1979) Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis. Heinemann, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Busco C, Giovannoni E, Scapens RW (2008) Managing the tensions in integrating global organisations: the role of performance management systems. Manage Account Res 19(2):103–125

    Google Scholar 

  • Capaldo P (1965) La programmazione aziendale. Giuffre, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Cescon F (1988) Il controllo di gestione nello sviluppo e nel risanamento aziendale. Cedam, Padova

    Google Scholar 

  • Chamberlin EH (1933) A theory of monopolistic competition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandler AD Jr (1962) Strategy and structure: chapters in the history of the American industrial enterprise. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandler AD Jr (1977) The visible hand. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandler AD Jr (1990) Scale and scope: the dynamics of industrial capitalism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Chenhall RH (2003) Management control system design within its organizational context: findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Account Org Soc 28(2–3):127–168

    Google Scholar 

  • Chenhall R (2005) Integrative strategic performance measurement systems, strategic alignment of manufacturing, learning and strategic outcomes: an exploratory study. Account Org Soc 30(5):395–422

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiesa V, Frattini F, Lazzarotti V, Manzini R (2008) Designing a performance measurement system for the research activities: a reference framework and an empirical study. J Eng Technol Manage 25(3):213–226

    Google Scholar 

  • Child J (1977) Organization: a guide to problems and practice. Harper and Row, New York/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Chua WF, Lowe T, Puxty T (eds) (1989) Critical perspectives in management control. Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp 3–7

    Google Scholar 

  • Church AH (1914) The science and practice of management. Engineering Magazine Company, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Clivillé V, Berrah L, Mauris G (2007) Quantitative expression and aggregation of performance measurements based on the MACBETH multi-criteria method. Int J Prod Econ 105(1):171–189

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase RH (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica 4(16):386–405

    Google Scholar 

  • Coates JB, Davis EW, Emmanuel CR, Longden SG, Stacey RJ (1992) Multinational companies’ performance measurement systems: international perspectives. Manage Account Res 3(2):133–150

    Google Scholar 

  • Copley FB (1923) Frederick W. Taylor: father of scientific management. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornell WB (1930) Business organization, vol 3, Modern business. Alexander Hamilton Institute, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Cournot AA (1838) Mémoire sur les applications du calcul des chances à la statistique judiciaire. Journal des mathématiques pures et appliquées 12(3):257–334

    Google Scholar 

  • Crozier M (1964) The bureaucratic phenomenon. The Chicago University Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Cyert RM, March JC (1963) A behavioral theory of the firm. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis RC (1928) The principles of factory organization and management. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis RC (1951) The fundamentals of top management. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • De Dominicis U (1966) Lezioni di ragioneria generale, vol 4. Foro-Lito Dini, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • de Haas M, Kleingeld A (1999) Multilevel design of performance measurement systems: enhancing strategic dialogue throughout the organization. Manage Account Res 10:233–261

    Google Scholar 

  • Dent AGH (1934) Budgetary control study. Industry Illustrated 2:28–30, 36

    Google Scholar 

  • Di Fenizio F (1963) La programmazione globale in Italia, 2nd edn. ISCO, Roma

    Google Scholar 

  • DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Am Sociol Rev 48(2):147–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Dore R (1983) Goodwill and the spirit of market capitalism. Br J Sociol 34:459–482

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunnette MD (1962) Personnel management. Annu Rev Psychol 13:285–314

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunnette MD (1973) The role of financial compensation in managerial motivation. Organ Behav Hum Perform 2:175–216

    Google Scholar 

  • Durkheim E (1933) The division of labour. Free, Glencoe

    Google Scholar 

  • Emerson H (1912) The twelve principles of efficiency. Engineering Magazine, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Etzioni A (1961) A comparative analysis of complex organizations: on power, involvement, and their correlates. Free, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Etzioni A (ed) (1969) The semi-professions and their organization. Collier-Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans PB (1975) Multiple hierarchies and organizational control. Adm Sci Q 20:250–259

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama EF (1980) Agency problems and the theory of the firm. J Polit Econ 88(2):288–307

    Google Scholar 

  • Fayol H (1949) General and industrial management. Pitman, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferreira A, Otley D (2009) The design and use of performance management systems: an extended framework for analysis. Manage Account Res 20:263–282

    Google Scholar 

  • Fink A (1874) The fink report on cost of transportation. The Railway Gazette, 30 May

    Google Scholar 

  • Flamholtz EG (1979) Towards a psycho-technical systems paradigm of organizational measurement. Decision Sci 10(1):71–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Flamholtz EG (1996) Effective organizational control. A framework, applications, and implications. Eur Manage J 14(6):596–611

    Google Scholar 

  • Flamholtz EG, Das TK, Tsui AS (1985) Toward an integrative framework of organizational control. Account Org Soc 10:35–50

    Google Scholar 

  • Fortunati V, Matacena A (1997) Programmazione e controllo della gestione aziendale. Clueb, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • Freeman RE (1984) Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. Pitman, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Galbraith JK (1967) The new industrial state. Penguin, Harmondsworth

    Google Scholar 

  • Galbraith JK (1969) How to control the military. Doubleday, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Garrison RH (1991) Managerial accounting. Irwin, Homewood

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghoshal S, Moran P (1996) Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory. Acad Manage Rev 21(1):13–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghidiglia C (1896) La ragioneria come scienza sociale ed economica. Garagnani, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • Giannessi E (1964) Corso di economia aziendale. Cursi, Pisa

    Google Scholar 

  • Giglioni GB, Bedeian AG (1974) A conspectus of management control theory: 1900–1972. Acad Manage J 17(2):292–305

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilmer BV (1960) Industrial psychology. In: Stone CP, Taylor DW (eds) Annual review of psychology, vol 11. Annual Reviews, Stanford, pp 323–350

    Google Scholar 

  • Gimbert X, Bisbe J, Mendoza X (2010) The role of performance measurement systems in strategy formulation processes. Long Range Plann 43(4):477–497

    Google Scholar 

  • Gitti V (1915) Ragioneria, VIth edn. Hoepli, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Gordon RA (1948) Short-period price determination in theory and practice. Am Econ Rev 38(3):265–288

    Google Scholar 

  • Gouldner AW (1950) Studies in leadership: leadership and democratic action. Harper & Brothers, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gouldner AW (1959) Reciprocity and autonomy in functional theory. In: Gross L (ed) Symposium on sociological theory. Row, Peterson, Evanston

    Google Scholar 

  • Govindarajan V, Gupta AK (1985) Linking control systems to business unit strategy: impact on performance. Account Org Soc 10(1):51–56

    Google Scholar 

  • Guarini A (1966) La programmazione aziendale: I programmi di produzione. Libreria Universitaria, Venezia

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall M (2008) The effect of comprehensive performance measurement systems on role clarity, psychological empowerment and managerial performance. Account Org Soc 33(2–3):141–163

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall RH (1963) The concept of bureaucracy: an empirical assessment. Am J Sociol 69(1):32–40

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart O (1989) An economist’s perspective on the theory of the firm. Columbia Law Rev 89(7):1757–1774

    Google Scholar 

  • Hassard J (1995) Sociology and organization theory: positivism, paradigms and postmodernity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek FA (1945) The use of knowledge in society. Am Econ Rev 35(4):519–530

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofstede GH (1968) The game of budget control. Tavistock, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofstede GH (1978) The poverty of management control philosophy. Acad Manage Rev 3(3):450–461

    Google Scholar 

  • Holden PE, Fish LS, Smith HL (1941) Top-management organization and control. Stanford University Press, Stanford University

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J Econ 10(1):74–91

    Google Scholar 

  • Holzer HP, Norreklit H (1991) Management accounting and control systems. Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 36(3):273–301

    Google Scholar 

  • Homans GC (1950) The human group. Harcourt, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopen D (2004) Consequences of changing behaviours. J Qual Particip 27(1):15–23

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopwood AG (1974) Accounting and human behaviour. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  • House RJ, Singh JV (1987) Organizational behavior: some new directions for I/O psychology. Annu Rev Psychol 38:669–718

    Google Scholar 

  • Ijiri Y (1975) Theory of accounting measurement. American Accounting Association, Sarasota

    Google Scholar 

  • Ittner CD, Larcker DF, Randall T (2003) Performance implications of strategic performance measurement in financial services firms. Account Org Soc 28:715–741

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen MC (1983) Organization theory and methodology. Account Rev 58(2):319–339

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen M, Meckling W (1976) Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. J Financ Econ 3:305–360

    Google Scholar 

  • Jerome WT III (1961) Executive control: the catalyst. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson HT, Kaplan RS (1987) Relevance lost: the rise and fall of management accounting. Harvard Business School, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn RL, Wolfe DM, Quinn RP, Snoek JD, Rosenthal RA (1964) Organizational stress: studies in role conflict and ambiguity. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan RS (1983) Measuring manufacturing performance: a new challenge for managerial accounting research. Account Rev 58:686–705

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan RS (1984) The evolution of management accounting. Account Rev 59(3):390–418

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan RS, Norton DP (1992) The balanced scorecard- measures that drive performance. Harv Bus Rev 70(1):71–79

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan RS, Norton DP (1994) The balanced scorecard: managing future performance video. Harvard Business School Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan RS, Norton DP (1996) Using the scorecard as a strategic management system. Harv Bus Rev 74:75–85

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz R (1978) Job longevity as a situational factor in job satisfaction. Adm Sci Q 23:204–223

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz D, Kahn RL (1978) The social psychology of organizations, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Keller W (1974) Accounting for corporate social performance. Manag Acc 39–41

    Google Scholar 

  • Kloot L, Martin J (2000) Strategic performance management: a balanced approach to performance management issues in local government. Manage Account Res 11(2):231–251

    Google Scholar 

  • Koontz HD (1959) Management control: a suggested formulation of principles. Calif Manage Rev 1:47–55

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamberti L, Noci G (2010) Marketing strategy and marketing performance measurement system: exploring the relationship. Eur Manage J 28(2):139–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Langfield-Smith K (1997) Management control systems and strategy: a critical review. Account Org Soc 22:207–232

    Google Scholar 

  • Langfield-Smith K (2007) A review of quantitative research in management control systems and strategy. In: Chapman CS, Hopwood A, Shields MD (eds) Handbook of management accounting research. Elsevier, Oxford, pp 753–784

    Google Scholar 

  • Lanzillotti R (1958) Pricing objectives in large companies. Am Econ Rev 48:921–940

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawrence P, Lorsch J (1967) Differentiation and integration in complex organizations. Adm Sci Q 12:1–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawrence PR, Lorsch JW (1969) Organization and environment. Irwin, Homewood

    Google Scholar 

  • Leavitt HJ, Bass BM (1964) Organization psychology. Annu Rev Psychol XV:371–398

    Google Scholar 

  • Lebas MJ (1992) ABM ou le management basé sur les activités. Revue Française de Comptabilité

    Google Scholar 

  • Lebas MJ (1995) Performance measurement and performance management. Int J Prod Econ 41(23):35

    Google Scholar 

  • Lebas MJ, Euske K (2002) A conceptual and operational delineation of performance. In: Neely A (ed) Business performance measurement: theory and practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 65–79

    Google Scholar 

  • Lichtner WO (1924) Planned control in manufacturing. Ronald, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Likert R (1961) New patterns of management. McGrawHill, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorange P, Morton MFS, Ghoshal S (1986) Strategic control systems. West, St. Paul

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorusso B (1922) Ragioneria generale basata sulle funzioni di controllo economico, 2nd edn. Laterza, Bari

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorusso B (1932) I capisaldi della teorica del Besta. Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria, Roma

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe EA (1971) On the idea of a management control system: integrating accounting and management control. J Manage Stud 8:1–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe EA, Machin JLJ (eds) (1983) New perspectives in management control. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Machlup F (1967) Theories of the firm: marginalist, behavioral, managerial. Am Econ Rev 57:1–33

    Google Scholar 

  • Malina M, Selto F (2001) Controlling and communicating strategy: an empirical test of the effectiveness of the balanced scorecard. J Manage Account Res 13:47–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Malinowski B (1944) A scientific theory of culture and other essays. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill

    Google Scholar 

  • March JG, Simon HA (1958) Organizations. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Margolis J (1958) The analysis of the firm: rationalism, conventionalism, and behaviorism. J Bus 31:187–199

    Google Scholar 

  • Masini C (1970) Lavoro e risparmio: economia d’azienda. UTET, Torino

    Google Scholar 

  • Maslow AH (1970) Motivation and personality, 2nd edn. Harper & Row, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Massa G (1905) Trattato completo di ragioneria. various editions, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Massa G (1906) Trattato completo di ragioneria. various editions, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Mattessich R (2007) Two hundred years of accounting research. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo E (1933) The human problems of an industrial civilization. MacMillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mechanic D (1962) Sources of power of lower participants in complex organizations. Adm Sci Q 7(3):349–364

    Google Scholar 

  • Mella P (1997) Controllo di gestione. UTET, Torino

    Google Scholar 

  • Melnyk SA, Stewart DM, Swink M (2004) Metrics and performance measurement in operations management: dealing with the metrics maze. J Oper Manage 22:209–217

    Google Scholar 

  • Merchant KA (1985) Control in business organizations. Pitman, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Merchant KA, Otley DT (2007) A review of the literature on control and accountability. In: Chapman CS, Hopwood AG, Shields MD (eds) Handbook of management accounting research. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 785–804

    Google Scholar 

  • Merchant KA, Van der Stede W (2007) Management control systems: performance measurement, evaluation and incentives. Financial Times, Harlow

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller P, O’Leary T (1987) Accounting and the construction of the governable person. Account Org Soc 12(3):235–265

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller D, Kets De Vries MFR, Toulouse J-M (1982) Top executive locus of control and its relationship to strategy-making, structure, and environment. Acad Manage J 25:237–253

    Google Scholar 

  • Mockler RJ (1967) Developing the science of management control. Financ Exec 35:80–93

    Google Scholar 

  • Moe TM (1984) The new economics of organization. Am J Polit Sci 28(4):739–777

    Google Scholar 

  • Mondini E (1898) La ragioneria generale, sesta edizione. Tipografia Editrice Ostinelli, Como

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan G (1980) Paradigms, metaphors, and puzzle solving in organization theory. Adm Sci Q 25:605–622

    Google Scholar 

  • Nanni AJ, Dixon JR, Vollmann TE (1990) The new performance challenge – measuring operations for world-class competition. Dow Jones-Irwin, Homewood

    Google Scholar 

  • Nanni AJ, Dixon JR, Vollmann TE (1992) Integrated performance measurement: management accounting to support the new manufacturing realities. J Manage Account Res 4(Fall):1–19

    Google Scholar 

  • Neely AD (1998) Performance measurement: why, what and how. Economist, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Nilsson F, Kald M (2002) Recent advances in performance management: the nordic case. Eur Manage Rev 20(3):235–245

    Google Scholar 

  • Nilsson F, Olve N-G (2001) Control systems in multibusiness companies: from performance management to strategic management. Eur Manage J 19(4):344–358

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor NG, Deng J, Luo Y (2006) Political constraints, organization design and performance measurement in China’s state-owned enterprises. Account Org Soc 21:157–177

    Google Scholar 

  • Onida P (1950) Economia d’azienda. Giuffrè, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Otley DT (1980) The contingency theory of management accounting: achievement and prognosis. Account Org Soc 5:413–428

    Google Scholar 

  • Otley DT (1999) Performance management: a framework for management control systems research. Manage Account Res 10:363–382

    Google Scholar 

  • Otley DT (2001) Extending the boundaries of management accounting research: developing systems for performance management. Brit Account Rev 33(3):243–261

    Google Scholar 

  • Otley D, Berry A (1980) Control, organisation and accounting. Account Org Soc 5(2):231–244

    Google Scholar 

  • Otley D, Broadbent J, Berry A (1995) Research in management control: an overview of its development [Special issue]. Brit J Manage 6:31–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Ouchi WG (1977) The relationship between organizational structure and organizational control. Adm Sci Q 22(95–1):13

    Google Scholar 

  • Ouchi WG (1979) A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms. Manage Sci 25:833–848

    Google Scholar 

  • Ouchi WG (1980) Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Adm Sci Q 25:129–141

    Google Scholar 

  • Papandreou AG (1952) Some basic problems in the theory of the firm. In: Haley BF (ed) A survey of contemporary economics. Irwin, Homewood

    Google Scholar 

  • Parsons T (1951) The social system. Free, Glencoe

    Google Scholar 

  • Parsons T (1956) Suggestions for a sociological approach to the theory of organizations-I. Adm Sci Q 1(1):63–85

    Google Scholar 

  • Penrose ET (1959) The theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Perrow C (1970) Organizational analysis: a sociological view. Tavistock, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Perrow C (1986) Complex organizations: a critical essay, 3rd edn. Random House, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Person HS (1929) The origin and nature of scientific management. In: Person HS (ed) Scientific management in American industry. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters T, Waterman RH Jr (1982) In search of excellence. Harper & Row, New York/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer J (1994) Competitive advantage through people: unleashing the power of the workforce. Harvard Business School, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Porter ME (1990) The competitive advantage of nations. Free, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Quinn RP, Kahn RL (1967) Organizational psychology. Annu Rev Psychol 18:437–466

    Google Scholar 

  • Radcliffe-Brown AR (1952) Structure and function in primitive society, essays and addresses. Free, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Rappaport A (1978) Executive incentives vs. corporate growth. Harv Bus Rev 57:81–88

    Google Scholar 

  • Rathe AW (1960) Management control in business. In: Malcolm DJ, Rowe AJ (eds) Management control systems. Wiley, New York, pp 28–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Reeves TK, Woodward J (1970) The study of managerial control. In: Woodward J (ed) Industrial organizations: behavior and control. Oxford University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Rice WB (1963) The enterprise and its environment. Tavistock Publications, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson WR (1925) Fundamentals of business organization. McGraw- Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson J (1933) The economics of imperfect competition. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Roethlisberger FJ (1962) Management and morale. Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Roethlisberger F, Dickson W (1941) Management and the worker. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose TG, Farr D (1957) Higher management control. McGraw- Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossi G (1921) Trattato di ragioneria scientifica, vol I. Cooperativa fra lavoranti tipografi, Reggio Emilia

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossi G (1922) La ragioneria, 3 vols, 2nd edn. Vallardi, Milan

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossi N (1966) L’economia di azienda e i suoi strumenti di indagine: scritture doppie in imprese mercantili, industriali, bancarie, 2nd edn. UTET, Torino

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothschild KW (1947) Price theory and oligopoly. Econ J 57(227):299–320

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowland FH (1947) Business planning and control. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sanguinetti A (1903) I nuovi orizzonti della Ragioneria italian. Tipografia A. Zerbini, Parma

    Google Scholar 

  • Schein EH (1965) Organizational psychology. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiff M, Lewin AY (1970) The impact of people on budgets. Account Rev 45(2):259–268

    Google Scholar 

  • Sciarelli S (1967) Il processo decisorio nell’impresa. CEDAM, Padova

    Google Scholar 

  • Scitovsky T (1943) A note on profit maximization and its implications. Rev Econ Stud XI:57–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott L (1981) The focused organization of social ties. Am J Sociol 86:1015–1035

    Google Scholar 

  • Selznick P (1943) An approach to a theory of bureaucracy. Am Sociol Rev 8:47–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Selznick P (1948) Foundations of the theory of organization. Am Sociol Rev 13:25–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Shank JK (1989) Strategic cost management: new wine, or just new bottles? J Manage Account Res 1(Fall):47–65

    Google Scholar 

  • Siboni B (2005) Introduzione allo studio di Storia della Ragioneria attraverso il pensiero e le opere dei suoi Maestri. Franco Angeli, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmonds K (1981) Strategic management accounting. Manage Account 59(4):26–29

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon H (1947) Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in administrative organizations. The Free, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon H (1976) Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in administrative organizations, 3rd edn. The Free, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon H (1991) Bounded rationality and organizational learning. Org Sci 2(1):121–134

    Google Scholar 

  • Simons R (1995) Levers of control: how managers use innovative control systems to drive strategic renewal. Harvard Business School Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Simons R (2000) Performance measurement and control systems for implementing strategies. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River

    Google Scholar 

  • Srebotnjak T (2007) The role of environmental statisticians in environmental policy: the case of performance measurement. Environ Sci Policy 10(5):405–418

    Google Scholar 

  • Superti Furga F (1969) La programmazione aziendale. Giuffrè, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Tannenbaum AJ (1962) Adolescent attitude toward academic brilliance. Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Tannenbaum AS (1968) Control in organizations. McGraw-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor FW (1911) Principles of scientific management. Harper & brothers, New York/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson JD (1967) Organizations in action. McGrow-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Tirole J (1988) The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Tocher KD (1970) Control. Oper Res Q 21(2):159–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Tocher KD (1976) Notes for discussion on “Control”. Oper Res Q 27(1 Part 2):231–239

    Google Scholar 

  • Trist EL, Higgin GW, Murray H, Pollock AB (1963) Organizational choice: capabilities of groups at the coal face under changing technologies: the loss, rediscovery & transformation of a work tradition. Tavistock, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Trundle GT (1931) Production control. In: Donald WJA (ed) Handbook of business administration. McGraw-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Trundle GT (1948) Managerial control of business. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuomela T (2005) The interplay of different levers of control: a case study of introducing a new performance measurement system. Manage Account Res 16(3):293–320

    Google Scholar 

  • Tyteca D (1996) On the measurement of environmental performance of firms – a literature review and a productive efficiency perspective. J Environ Manage 46(3):281–308

    Google Scholar 

  • Urwick L (1928) The principles of direction and control. In: Lee J (ed) Dictionary of industrial administration. Pitman’s, London, pp 161–179

    Google Scholar 

  • Urwick L (1943) Administration in theory and practice. Brit Manage Rev 8:37–59

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Maanen J (1975) Police socialization: a longitudinal examination of job attitudes in an urban police department. Adm Sci Q 20(2):207–228

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian HR (1984) Microeconomic analysis. W.W. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Vickers G (1967) Towards a sociology of management. Chapman and Hall, London

    Google Scholar 

  • von Bertalanffy L (1950) An outline of general system theory. Brit J Philos Sci 1(2):134–165

    Google Scholar 

  • von Bertalanffy L (1968) Organismic psychology and systems theory. Clark University Press, Worchester

    Google Scholar 

  • von Mises L (1944) Bureaucracy. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • von Stackelberg H (1934) Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Verlag von Julius Springer, Wien

    Google Scholar 

  • Vroom VH, Maier NRF (1961) Industrial social psychology. Annu Rev Psychol 12:M228

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber M (1968) Basic sociological terms. In: Roth G, Wittich C (eds) Economy and society. University of California Press, Berkeley

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiener N (1948) Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and the machine. The Technology Press/Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson OE (1971) The vertical integration of production: market failure considerations. Am Econ Rev 61:112–123

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson OE (1975) Markets and hierarchies. Free, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson OE (1981) The economics of organization: the transaction cost approach. Am J Sociol 87(3):548–577

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J (1958) Industrial organization. Theory and practice. Oxford University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Zappa G (1927) Tendenze nuove negli studi di ragioneria. IES, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Zappa G (1950) Il reddito d’impresa. Scritture doppie, conti e bilanci di aziende commerciali, 2nd edn. Giuffrè, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Zappa G (1957) Le produzioni nell’economia delle imprese. Giuffrè, Milano

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Demartini, C. (2014). The Evolution of the Concept of ‘Management Control’: Towards a Definition of ‘Performance Management System’. In: Performance Management Systems. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36684-0_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics