Device-Level Extensions

Chapter
Part of the In-Memory Data Management Research book series (IMDM)

Abstract

In the preceding chapter, I depicted possible attacks that motivate the need for specific security requirements for RFID environments. The following chapter deals with concrete device-level security extensions for use in combination with low-cost RFID tags to keep product surcharges low. To support the fast adoption of RFID technology in the pharmaceutical supply chain, I developed the following authentication protocols to address device-level security aspects. They are designed to keep tag production costs low due to my assumption that this is the primary barrier for wide spreading of RFID-aided supply chains and EPCglobal networks in the pharmaceutical supply chain. In terms of the security matrix introduced in Sect. 3.3 device-level security extensions focus on (a) tag and reader devices from the technical view and (b) product counterfeits from the business view. In the following, I introduce authentication protocols, which were designed for use with passive low-cost tags from the technical perspective while improving the detection of product counterfeits from the business perspective.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hasso Plattner InstitutePotsdamGermany

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