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Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Legislative Bargaining

Chapter

Abstract

In legislative bargaining of the Baron-Ferejohn type, veto players either hold all of the overall power of 1 and share proportional to their recognition probabilities, or hold no power at all. Hence, in this setting, it is impossible to provide non-cooperative support for power indices that do not assign all or no power to veto players. This highlights problems in the interpretation of results of Valenciano (2008a, b) which are taken as support for the Shapley-Shubik index and other normalized semi-values.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful for financial support from the Academy of Finland, and also want to thank Manfred J. Holler, Stefan Napel, Maria Montero as well as two anonymous referees for very valuable comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Public Choice Research CentreUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland
  2. 2.Institute of Socio EconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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