Pure Bargaining Problems and the Shapley Rule

Chapter

Abstract

Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Research partially supported by Grants SGR 2009–01029 of the Catalonia Government (Generalitat de Catalunya), and MTM 2012–34426 of the Economy and Competitiveness Spanish Ministry.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied Mathematics II and Industrial and Aeronautical Engineering School of TerrassaTechnical University of CataloniaCataloniaSpain
  2. 2.ETSEIATTerrassaSpain
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsNaval Postgraduate SchoolMontereyUSA

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