Pure Bargaining Problems and the Shapley Rule
Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.
Research partially supported by Grants SGR 2009–01029 of the Catalonia Government (Generalitat de Catalunya), and MTM 2012–34426 of the Economy and Competitiveness Spanish Ministry.
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