Abstract
We analyse the projected future evolution of the distribution of voting power and related quantities under the qualified majority (QM) decision rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU, prescribed by the Nice and Lisbon Treaties. Our projections are based on the demographic changes forecast by Eurostat (2008) for the period stretching from the year 2008 to the year 2061. We use a method similar to the one we used in Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2007).
An earlier version of this chapter was published in Homo Oeconomicus 26(3/4), 2009.
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Notes
- 1.
See (Treaty of Lisbon (2007), p. 3).
- 2.
This rule was first adopted at the Brussels IGC, 17–18 June 2004 (See CIG 85/04 2004), and was included in the proposed EU Constitution, which failed to be ratified and was abandoned. Subsequently, the same rule was confirmed on 23 June 2007 by the Council of the European Union (the ‘EU Summit’), also held in Brussels. (See 11177/1/07 REV 1 (2007)).
- 3.
See (Treaty of Lisbon (2007), p. 18). Article 9c contains four additional clauses which we have not cited here as they are not directly pertinent to this article.
- 4.
The main—and dominant—clause in the Nice QM rule assigned voting weights to the member-states; these weights took account of population sizes as they were at the time (2000), but were to remain fixed henceforth.
- 5.
In view of this fact it is rather strange that—as far as we know—the EU does not have a uniform definition of the ‘population’ of each member-state, and a legally binding procedure ascertaining its size at synchronized regular intervals.
- 6.
In fact, \(\psi \) is their harmonic mean. For further details see (Felsenthal and Machover (1998), pp. 49–51).
- 7.
For reasons of internal national politics, a government normally considers it more important to be able to block a CM act that it opposes than to secure approval of an act it favours. Also, a government that finds itself in a position where it would be able to block a CM act may use this as a bargaining chip: agree to vote for the act in exchange for concession on matters that may or may not be related to that act.
- 8.
For details, see (Felsenthal and Machover (1998), pp. 60–61).
- 9.
For further details see (Felsenthal and Machover (1998), p. 61).
- 10.
For further details see (Felsenthal and Machover (1998), p. 62).
- 11.
In fact Denmark, as well as Finland and Slovakia, will experience the smallest change in \(\beta \), and consequently in their equitability Quotient.
References
11177/1/07 REV 1. (2007). Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council 21/22 June 2007—Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 20 July 2007. EU Document 11177/1/07 REV 1.
CIG 85/04. (2004). Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Brussels, 18 June 2004. EU document CIG 85/04.
Eurostat (the statistical office of the European Commission), project EUROPOP2008 (EUROpean POpulation Projections, base year 2008).
Felsenthal, D. S., & Machover, M. (1998). The measurement of voting power: Theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Felsenthal, D. S., & Machover, M. (2001). The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 18(3), 431–464. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/420/.
Felsenthal, D. S., & Machover, M. (2004a). Analysis of QM rules in the draft Constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003. Social Choice and Welfare 23(1), 1–20. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/429/.
Felsenthal, D. S., & Machover, M. (2004b). Analysis of QM rule adopted by the EU Inter-Governmental Conference Brussels, 18 June 2004, Project Report. London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/431/
Felsenthal, D. S., & Machover, M. (2007). Analysis of QM Rule adopted by the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 23 June 2007, Project Report. London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/2531/.
Nurmi, H. (2008). On the relative unimportance of voting weights. Observations on Agenda-Based Voting Procedures. Mimeograph. http://tinyurl.com/ad7yt6
Treaty of Lisbon. (2007). Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Official Journal of the European Union 50, notice no. 2007/C306/ 17 December 2007.
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Acknowledgments
Voting Power and Procedures Programme: Supported by Voting Power in Practice Grant F/07 004/AJ from the Leverhulme Trust, which the authors gratefully acknowledge.
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Felsenthal, D.S., Machover, M. (2013). The QM Rule in the Nice and Lisbon Treaties: Future Projections. In: Holler, M., Nurmi, H. (eds) Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_31
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