Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters

Chapter

Abstract

Two measures of circumstantial or local power are introduced here. In our approach we focus on the viewpoint of an external observer who tries to evaluate the probability of a proposal to be passed by a certain committee. According to this local point of view we analyze the changes in the probability to pass the issue at hand obtained by modifying a voters’ perception about the proposal. In particular, we are interested in finding optimal persuadable voters and optimal bribable voters. To this end three preorderings on the set of voters are considered which are proved to be useful to identify these optimal voters.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied Mathematics III and High Engineering School of ManresaTechnical University of Catalonia, EPSEMManresaSpain

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