Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index

  • José M. Alonso-Meijide
  • Balbina Casas-Méndez
  • M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
  • Manfred J. Holler
  • Andreas Nohn


In games with a coalition structure, players organize themselves in coalitions that form a partition of the set of players. In games with a coalition configuration, the union of the coalitions is the whole set of players but the coalitions are not necessarily disjoint. We introduce two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a coalition configuration, provide axiomatic characterizations of them, and apply them to a real world example.



This research received financial support from the Academy of Finland, as well as from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Spain) and FEDER through Projects ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2011-27731-C03-02 and MTM2011-27731-C03-03 and from Xunta de Galicia through Project INCITE09-207-064-PR.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • José M. Alonso-Meijide
    • 1
  • Balbina Casas-Méndez
    • 1
  • M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
    • 2
  • Manfred J. Holler
    • 3
  • Andreas Nohn
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Statistics and Operations ResearchUniversity of Santiago de CompostelaSantiago de CompostelaSpain
  2. 2.Department of Statistics and Operations ResearchUniversity of VigoVigoSpain
  3. 3.Institute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of Hamburg, Germany and Public Choice Research CentreTurkuFinland
  4. 4.Public Choice Research CentreTurkuFinland
  5. 5.Institute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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