Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index
In games with a coalition structure, players organize themselves in coalitions that form a partition of the set of players. In games with a coalition configuration, the union of the coalitions is the whole set of players but the coalitions are not necessarily disjoint. We introduce two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a coalition configuration, provide axiomatic characterizations of them, and apply them to a real world example.
This research received financial support from the Academy of Finland, as well as from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Spain) and FEDER through Projects ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2011-27731-C03-02 and MTM2011-27731-C03-03 and from Xunta de Galicia through Project INCITE09-207-064-PR.
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