The aim of this paper is to provide a constraint satisfaction account of the doctrine of consistent interpretation developed by the European Court of Justice (now the Court of Justice of the EU) to protect effective and harmonious realization of the Communities’ aims. The doctrine can be naturally seen as pursuit for establishing coherence in initially incoherent set of propositions. I represent the doctrine in the framework of coherence-based model of legal argumentation (CMLA). An attempt to represent Marleasing case in this framework is discussed.


consistent interpretation coherence constraint satisfaction European Court of Justice legal argumentation 


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michał Araszkiewicz
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Law and Administration, Department of Legal TheoryJagiellonian UniversityKrakówPoland

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