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Self-enforcing Electronic Voting

  • Feng Hao
  • Brian Randell
  • Dylan Clarke
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7622)

Abstract

Verifiable electronic voting has been extensively researched for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deployment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols’ universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has been a de facto standard in the field. However, this dependence is actually a legacy inherited from traditional physical voting, one that has proved problematic in the electronic context. In this paper, we propose a radically new concept called “self-enforcing electronic voting”, which refers to voting systems that are free from reliance on any tallying authority. This proposal goes significantly further than all existing or proposed e-voting systems. We explain the feasibility of this new approach, with a theoretical definition of the system properties, a concrete engineering design, a practical implementation, and real-world trial experiments. We also highlight some open issues for further research.

Keywords

Vote System Security Protocol Electronic Vote Feedback Questionnaire Elliptic Curve Digital Signing Algorithm 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Adida, B., Marneffe, O., Pereira, O., Quisquater, J.J.: Electing a University President Using Open-Audit Voting: Analysis of Real-World Use of Helios. In: Proceedings of the Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (2009)Google Scholar
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    Hao. F., Kreeger, M.N.: Every vote counts: ensuring integrity in DRE-based voting system. Newcastle University technical report No. 1268 (2011)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Hao, F., Zieliński, P.: A 2-Round Anonymous Veto Protocol. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 2006. LNCS, vol. 5087, pp. 202–211. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Feng Hao
    • 1
  • Brian Randell
    • 1
  • Dylan Clarke
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computing ScienceNewcastle UniversityUK

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