Abstract
The problem of determining whether a receiver may safely accept attributes (e.g., identity, credentials, location) of unknown senders in various online social protocols is a special instance of a more general problem of establishing trust in interactive protocols. We introduce the notion of interactive trust protocols to illustrate the usefulness of social collateral in reducing the inherent trust asymmetry in large classes of online user interactions. We define a social collateral model that allows receivers to accept attributes from unknown senders based on explicit recommendations received from social relations. We use social collateral as a measure of both social relations and “tie strength” among individuals to provide different degrees of accountability when accepting attribute information from unknown senders. Our model is robust in the face of several specific attacks, such as impersonation and tie-strength-amplification attacks. Preliminary experiments with visualization of measured tie strength among users of a social network indicate that the model is usable by ordinary protocol participants.
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Kim, T.HJ., Gligor, V., Perrig, A. (2012). Street-Level Trust Semantics for Attribute Authentication. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J., Stajano, F., Anderson, J. (eds) Security Protocols XX. Security Protocols 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7622. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35694-0_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35694-0_12
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