Payment Approval for PayWord

  • László Aszalós
  • Andrea Huszti
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7690)


In case of micropayment schemes, all costs that appear during functioning should be minimized. This includes cost of disputes and charge backs that result in penalties for the vendor. We extend the PayWord micropayment scheme with payment approval to minimize disputes, charge backs or to avoid attacks that ruin the reputation of the vendor. Payment approval is achieved by employing a MAC function per a purchase, that does not increase time complexity significantly. A formal evaluation in applied π and a proof that our scheme fulfills secure payment authorization, payment approval and secrecy of payment information are also given.


Message Authentication Code Hash Chain Asymmetric Encryption Strand Space Payment Information 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • László Aszalós
    • 1
  • Andrea Huszti
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of InformaticsUniversity of DebrecenDebrecenHungary

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