A Method Based on Congestion Game Theory for Determining Electoral Tendencies

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7710)


We present a novel method to study the tendencies of vote in sectorial democratic elections. Our method is intended to determine the relevant profiles characterizing the political behavior of voters. Those profiles allow us to model how the voters, in a specific election organized by sectors, make their vote decision. Furthermore, the same set of profiles are used for representing the different strategies applied by the candidates that compete in the election.

We apply congestion games theory to simulate the distribution of the votes among the candidates, describing an automated way to estimate the likely number of votes for each candidate. Therefore, we can determine who will be the winner candidate of the election, according to a specific political scenario. We report the application of our model to simulate the elections of a director in a university setting, obtaining estimations very close to the actual outcomes.


Social Behavior Modeling Social Simulation Electoral Simulation Congestion Games Multi-Agent System 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Computer SciencesBUAPMéxico
  2. 2.Instituto Nacional de AstrofísicaÓptica y ElectrónicaMéxico

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