A Secure Architecture for Smart Meter Systems

  • Daniel Angermeier
  • Konstantin Böttinger
  • Andreas Ibing
  • Dieter Schuster
  • Frederic Stumpf
  • Dirk Wacker
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7672)


We present a new architecture for a secure smart metering system. Our architecture is based on a special purpose hardware security module that encapsulates all security critical operations and provides the main functionality of the system in an active role. This new approach enables secure meter data handling within the smart grid. As a result, our architecture preserves the privacy of sensitive consumer data and the integrity of meter data. Additionally, our proposed solution enhances the security of components critical to the operation of the power grid.


Smart Card Smart Grid Wide Area Network Secure Architecture Secure Storage 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Angermeier
    • 1
  • Konstantin Böttinger
    • 1
  • Andreas Ibing
    • 1
  • Dieter Schuster
    • 1
  • Frederic Stumpf
    • 1
  • Dirk Wacker
    • 2
  1. 1.Fraunhofer Research Institution AISECMunichGermany
  2. 2.Giesecke & DevrientMunichGermany

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