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Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

  • Amos Fiat
  • Ariel Levavi
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)

Abstract

In this work we give a tight lower bound on makespan approximation for envy-free allocation mechanisms dedicated to scheduling tasks on unrelated machines. Specifically, we show that no mechanism exists that can guarantee an envy-free allocation of jobs to m machines with a makespan less than a factor of O(logm) of the minimal makespan. Combined with previous results, this paper definitively proves that the optimal algorithm for obtaining a minimal makespan for any envy-free division can at best approximate the makespan to a factor of O(logm).

Keywords

makespan approximation locally-efficient envy-freeness mechanism design scheduling 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amos Fiat
    • 1
  • Ariel Levavi
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  2. 2.School of Computer Science and EngineeringUC San DiegoSan DiegoUSA

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