Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits

  • Paul Dütting
  • Monika Henzinger
  • Martin Starnberger
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)
Cite this paper as:
Dütting P., Henzinger M., Starnberger M. (2012) Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits. In: Goldberg P.W. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7695. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold for public budgets, while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both cases the harder variant to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Dütting
    • 1
  • Monika Henzinger
    • 2
  • Martin Starnberger
    • 2
  1. 1.École Polytechnique Fédérale de LausanneSwitzerland
  2. 2.Fakultät für InformatikUniversität WienAustria

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