Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies

  • Swapnil Dhamal
  • Yadati Narahari
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)


Many networks such as social networks and organizational networks in global companies consist of self-interested agents. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in important tasks such as information diffusion and information extraction. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a stable network having that topology. We study this interesting reverse engineering problem by proposing a natural model of recursive network formation and a utility model that captures many key features. Based on this model, we analyze relevant network topologies and derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies emerge as pairwise stable networks, wherein no node wants to delete any of its links and no two nodes would want to create a link between them.


Social Networks Network Formation Pairwise Stability Network Topology Strategic Agents 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Dhamal, S., Narahari, Y.: Sufficient conditions for formation of a network topology by self-interested agents. Arxiv preprint arXiv:1201.1676 (2012)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Doreian, P.: Actor network utilities and network evolution. Social networks 28(2), 137–164 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Goyal, S., Vega-Redondo, F.: Structural holes in social networks. Journal of Economic Theory 137(1), 460–492 (2007)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Hummon, N.: Utility and dynamic social networks. Social Networks 22(3), 221–249 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Jackson, M.: The stability and efficiency of economic and social networks. Advances in Economic Design 6, 1–62 (2003)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Jackson, M.: Social and Economic Networks. Princeton Univ. Press (2008)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Jackson, M., Watts, A.: The evolution of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory 106(2), 265–295 (2002)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Mutuswami, S., Winter, E.: Subscription mechanisms for network formation. Journal of Economic Theory 106(2), 242–264 (2002)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Pantz, K., Ziegelmeyer, A.: An experimental study of network formation, Garching, Germany. Max Planck Institute, mimeo (2003)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Watts, A.: A dynamic model of network formation. Games and Economic Behavior 34(2), 331–341 (2001)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Woodard, C., Parkes, D.: Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation. In: 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon) (2003)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Swapnil Dhamal
    • 1
  • Yadati Narahari
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Institute of ScienceBangaloreIndia

Personalised recommendations