Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies
Many networks such as social networks and organizational networks in global companies consist of self-interested agents. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in important tasks such as information diffusion and information extraction. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a stable network having that topology. We study this interesting reverse engineering problem by proposing a natural model of recursive network formation and a utility model that captures many key features. Based on this model, we analyze relevant network topologies and derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies emerge as pairwise stable networks, wherein no node wants to delete any of its links and no two nodes would want to create a link between them.
KeywordsSocial Networks Network Formation Pairwise Stability Network Topology Strategic Agents
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Dhamal, S., Narahari, Y.: Sufficient conditions for formation of a network topology by self-interested agents. Arxiv preprint arXiv:1201.1676 (2012)Google Scholar
- 5.Jackson, M.: The stability and efficiency of economic and social networks. Advances in Economic Design 6, 1–62 (2003)Google Scholar
- 6.Jackson, M.: Social and Economic Networks. Princeton Univ. Press (2008)Google Scholar
- 9.Pantz, K., Ziegelmeyer, A.: An experimental study of network formation, Garching, Germany. Max Planck Institute, mimeo (2003)Google Scholar
- 11.Woodard, C., Parkes, D.: Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation. In: 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon) (2003)Google Scholar