Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects

  • Michal Feldman
  • Tami Tamir
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)


We study the model of resource allocation games with conflicting congestion effects introduced by Feldman and Tamir (2012). In this model, an agent’s cost consists of its resource’s load (which increases with congestion) and its share in the resource’s activation cost (which decreases with congestion). The current work studies the convergence rate of best-response dynamics (BRD) in the case of homogeneous agents. Even within this simple setting, interesting phenomena arise. We show that, in contrast to standard congestion games with identical jobs and resources, the convergence rate of BRD under conflicting congestion effects might be super-linear in the number of jobs. Nevertheless, a specific form of BRD is proposed, which is guaranteed to converge in linear time.


Nash Equilibrium Convergence Rate Convergence Time Congestion Game Potential Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michal Feldman
    • 1
    • 2
  • Tami Tamir
    • 3
  1. 1.Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Harvard UniversityUSA
  3. 3.School of Computer ScienceThe Interdisciplinary CenterHerzliyaIsrael

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