On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality

  • Dvir Falik
  • Reshef Meir
  • Moshe Tennenholtz
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_19

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)
Cite this paper as:
Falik D., Meir R., Tennenholtz M. (2012) On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality. In: Goldberg P.W. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7695. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We consider elections under the Plurality rule, where all voters are assumed to act strategically. As there are typically many Nash equilibria for every preference profile, and strong equilibria do not always exist, we analyze the most stable outcomes according to their stability scores (the number of coalitions with an interest to deviate). We show a tight connection between the Maximin score of a candidate and the highest stability score of the outcomes where this candidate wins, and show that under mild conditions the Maximin winner will also be the winner in the most stable outcome under Plurality.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dvir Falik
    • 1
  • Reshef Meir
    • 2
    • 3
  • Moshe Tennenholtz
    • 2
    • 4
  1. 1.Tel-Aviv UniversityTel-AvivIsrael
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchHerzliaIsrael
  3. 3.Hebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael
  4. 4.Technion-Israel Institute of TechnologyIsrael

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