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LP-Based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2012)

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Abstract

We design a new class of vertex and set cover games, where the price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs. This is in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy grows linearly with the size of the game. Both the game design and the price of anarchy results are based on structural properties of the linear programming relaxations. For linear costs we also exhibit simple best-response dynamics that converge to Nash equilibria in linear time.

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Piliouras, G., Valla, T., Végh, L.A. (2012). LP-Based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy. In: Goldberg, P.W. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7695. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35310-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35311-6

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