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Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 7695))

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Abstract

We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.

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Maya, A., Nisan, N. (2012). Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting. In: Goldberg, P.W. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7695. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35310-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35311-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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