Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting

  • Avishay Maya
  • Noam Nisan
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_13

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)
Cite this paper as:
Maya A., Nisan N. (2012) Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting. In: Goldberg P.W. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7695. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Avishay Maya
    • 1
  • Noam Nisan
    • 2
    • 1
  1. 1.Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchUSA

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