Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting

  • Avishay Maya
  • Noam Nisan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)

Abstract

We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.

References

  1. 1.
    Alon, N., Fischer, F., Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors. In: Proc. of 13th TARK, pp. 101–110 (2011)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge University Press (1996)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M.: The Efficiency of Fair Division. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 475–482. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Chen, Y., Lai, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Procaccia, A.D.: Truth, justice and cake cutting. In: Proc. of 24th AAAI, pp. 756–761 (2010)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 17–33 (1971)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 617–631 (1973)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Maya, A., Nisan, N.: Incentive compatible two player cake cutting. Full version available as arXiv preprint, http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.0155
  8. 8.
    Mossel, E., Tamuz, O.: Truthful Fair Division. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds.) SAGT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6386, pp. 288–299. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58–73 (1981)MathSciNetMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Approximate mechanism design without money. In: Proc. of 10th EC, pp. 177–186 (2009)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 8–37 (1961)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Avishay Maya
    • 1
  • Noam Nisan
    • 2
    • 1
  1. 1.Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchUSA

Personalised recommendations