Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting

  • Avishay Maya
  • Noam Nisan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)


We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.


Social Welfare Competitive Ratio Incentive Compatible Valuation Function Aligned Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Alon, N., Fischer, F., Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors. In: Proc. of 13th TARK, pp. 101–110 (2011)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge University Press (1996)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M.: The Efficiency of Fair Division. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 475–482. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Chen, Y., Lai, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Procaccia, A.D.: Truth, justice and cake cutting. In: Proc. of 24th AAAI, pp. 756–761 (2010)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 17–33 (1971)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 617–631 (1973)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Maya, A., Nisan, N.: Incentive compatible two player cake cutting. Full version available as arXiv preprint,
  8. 8.
    Mossel, E., Tamuz, O.: Truthful Fair Division. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds.) SAGT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6386, pp. 288–299. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58–73 (1981)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Approximate mechanism design without money. In: Proc. of 10th EC, pp. 177–186 (2009)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 8–37 (1961)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Avishay Maya
    • 1
  • Noam Nisan
    • 2
    • 1
  1. 1.Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchUSA

Personalised recommendations