Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting
We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Alon, N., Fischer, F., Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors. In: Proc. of 13th TARK, pp. 101–110 (2011)Google Scholar
- 2.Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge University Press (1996)Google Scholar
- 4.Chen, Y., Lai, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Procaccia, A.D.: Truth, justice and cake cutting. In: Proc. of 24th AAAI, pp. 756–761 (2010)Google Scholar
- 5.Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 17–33 (1971)Google Scholar
- 6.Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 617–631 (1973)Google Scholar
- 7.Maya, A., Nisan, N.: Incentive compatible two player cake cutting. Full version available as arXiv preprint, http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.0155
- 10.Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Approximate mechanism design without money. In: Proc. of 10th EC, pp. 177–186 (2009)Google Scholar
- 11.Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 8–37 (1961)Google Scholar