A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Competitive Diffusion Process over Social Networks

  • Vasileios Tzoumas
  • Christos Amanatidis
  • Evangelos Markakis
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)

Abstract

We study a game-theoretic model for the diffusion of competing products in social networks. Particularly, we consider a simultaneous non-cooperative game between competing firms that try to target customers in a social network. This triggers a competitive diffusion process, and the goal of each firm is to maximize the eventual number of adoptions of its own product. We study issues of existence, computation and performance (social inefficiency) of pure strategy Nash equilibria in these games. We mainly focus on 2-player games, and we model the diffusion process using the known linear threshold model. Nonetheless, many of our results continue to hold under a more general framework for this process.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vasileios Tzoumas
    • 1
    • 3
  • Christos Amanatidis
    • 2
  • Evangelos Markakis
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Electrical and Computer EngineeringNational Technical University of AthensGreece
  2. 2.Department of InformaticsAthens University of Economics and BusinessGreece
  3. 3.Department of Electrical and Systems EngineeringUniversity of PennsylvaniaUSA

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