Abstract
In this chapter we develop a model in which candidates have fixed positions on a single issue dimension on which one candidate has an advantage by being closer to the median voter. The disadvantaged candidate can introduce a new issue to win the election. When all voters have separable preferences and the advantaged candidate moves last on the new issue, there is no way for the disadvantaged candidate to win. When some voters have nonseparable preferences over the issues, the disadvantaged can take a position that the advantaged candidate cannot beat. Candidates in an election can benefit from introducing new issues, but only when some voters have nonseparable preferences. Using data from a 2004 survey, we show that a substantial percentage of US voters have nonseparable preferences for many issues of public policy, creating incentives and opportunities for political candidates to package issues.
The National Science Foundation provided financial support for this research through Grant No. SES-0242255.
Presented at the Conference on Contemporary Applications of the Spatial Model, The Juan March Institute, Madrid, Spain, April 27–28, 2012.
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Notes
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- 2.
Knowledge Networks recruited over 50,000 subjects nationwide to participate in surveys administered by WebTV. The computer format of the survey allows respondents to complete surveys at their leisure, and often results in more reliable and valid responses than telephone interviews (Chang and Krosnick 2009). A random sample of the Knowledge Networks panel was chosen to participate in a three-wave survey, with Wave 1 conducted April 27–May 31 (N=1308); Wave 2, September 17–October 7 (N=947); and Wave 3, November 19–December 3, 2004 (N=717). A sample of 211 new respondents also completed interviews in Wave 3. Completion rates were 76 percent in Wave 1, 85 percent in Wave 2, and 77 percent in Wave 3.
- 3.
The percentages of respondents with nonseparable preferences for taxes conditional on education does not have to match the percentage with nonseparable preferences for education spending conditional on taxes since voters may have partially nonseparable preferences (Lacy 2001).
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Lacy, D., Niou, E.M.S. (2013). Nonseparable Preferences and Issue Packaging in Elections. In: Schofield, N., Caballero, G., Kselman, D. (eds) Advances in Political Economy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_10
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