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International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security

ASIACRYPT 2012: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012 pp 116–133Cite as

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Completeness for Symmetric Two-Party Functionalities - Revisited

Completeness for Symmetric Two-Party Functionalities - Revisited

  • Yehuda Lindell18,
  • Eran Omri19 &
  • Hila Zarosim18 
  • Conference paper
  • 3551 Accesses

  • 5 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7658)

Abstract

Understanding the minimal assumptions required for carrying out cryptographic tasks is one of the fundamental goals of theoretical cryptography. A rich body of work has been dedicated to understanding the complexity of cryptographic tasks in the context of (semi-honest) secure two-party computation. Much of this work has focused on the characterization of trivial and complete functionalities (resp., functionalities that can be securely implemented unconditionally, and functionalities that can be used to securely compute all functionalities).

All previous works define reductions via an ideal implementation of the functionality; i.e., f reduces to g if one can implement f using an ideal box (or oracle) that computes the function g and returns the output to both parties. Such a reduction models the computation of f as an atomic operation. However, in the real-world, protocols proceed in rounds, and the output is not learned by the parties simultaneously. In this paper we show that this distinction is significant. Specifically, we show that there exist symmetric functionalities (where both parties receive the same outcome), that are neither trivial nor complete under “ideal-box reductions”, and yet the existence of a constant-round protocol for securely computing such a functionality implies infinitely-often oblivious transfer (meaning that it is secure for infinitely-many n’s). In light of the above, we propose an alternative definitional infrastructure for studying the triviality and completeness of functionalities.

Keywords

  • Secure Protocol
  • Security Parameter
  • Oblivious Transfer
  • Private Input
  • Weak Correctness

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This work was supported by the israel science foundation (grant No. 189/11). Hila Zarosim is grateful to the Azrieli Foundation for the award of an Azrieli Fellowship. This work was done while Eran Omri was at Bar-Ilan University.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bar-Ilan University, Israel

    Yehuda Lindell & Hila Zarosim

  2. Ariel University Center, Israel

    Eran Omri

Authors
  1. Yehuda Lindell
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  2. Eran Omri
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  3. Hila Zarosim
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tsinghua University, 30 Shuangqing Road, 100084, Beijing, China

    Xiaoyun Wang

  2. Central Research Laboratories, NEC, 1754 Shimonumabe Nakahara, 211-8666, Kawasaki, Japan

    Kazue Sako

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© 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Lindell, Y., Omri, E., Zarosim, H. (2012). Completeness for Symmetric Two-Party Functionalities - Revisited. In: Wang, X., Sako, K. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012. ASIACRYPT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7658. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_9

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34960-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34961-4

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