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International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security

ASIACRYPT 2012: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012 pp 98–115Cite as

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  2. Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012
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Signature Schemes Secure against Hard-to-Invert Leakage

Signature Schemes Secure against Hard-to-Invert Leakage

  • Sebastian Faust18,
  • Carmit Hazay19,
  • Jesper Buus Nielsen18,
  • Peter Sebastian Nordholt18 &
  • …
  • Angela Zottarel18 
  • Conference paper
  • 3770 Accesses

  • 24 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7658)

Abstract

In the auxiliary input model an adversary is allowed to see a computationally hard-to-invert function of the secret key. The auxiliary input model weakens the bounded leakage assumption commonly made in leakage resilient cryptography as the hard-to-invert function may information-theoretically reveal the entire secret key. In this work, we propose the first constructions of digital signature schemes that are secure in the auxiliary input model. Our main contribution is a digital signature scheme that is secure against chosen message attacks when given an exponentially hard-to-invert function of the secret key. As a second contribution, we construct a signature scheme that achieves security for random messages assuming that the adversary is given a polynomial-time hard to invert function. Here, polynomial-hardness is required even when given the entire public-key – so called weak auxiliary input security. We show that such signature schemes readily give us auxiliary input secure identification schemes.

Keywords

  • Encryption Scheme
  • Signature Scheme
  • Auxiliary Input
  • Digital Signature Scheme
  • Security Notion

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

A full version of this article can be found at http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/045

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Aarhus University, Denmark

    Sebastian Faust, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Peter Sebastian Nordholt & Angela Zottarel

  2. Computer Engineering Department, Bar-Ilan University, Israel

    Carmit Hazay

Authors
  1. Sebastian Faust
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  2. Carmit Hazay
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  3. Jesper Buus Nielsen
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  4. Peter Sebastian Nordholt
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  5. Angela Zottarel
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tsinghua University, 30 Shuangqing Road, 100084, Beijing, China

    Xiaoyun Wang

  2. Central Research Laboratories, NEC, 1754 Shimonumabe Nakahara, 211-8666, Kawasaki, Japan

    Kazue Sako

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© 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Cite this paper

Faust, S., Hazay, C., Nielsen, J.B., Nordholt, P.S., Zottarel, A. (2012). Signature Schemes Secure against Hard-to-Invert Leakage. In: Wang, X., Sako, K. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012. ASIACRYPT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7658. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_8

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34960-7

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