Abstract
The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G = (V,E) with an edge weighting w: E → ℝ + and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector \(p\in{\mathbb R}^V_+\) that satisfies p u + p v = w(uv) for all uv ∈ M and p u = 0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable if it prevents blocking pairs, i.e., pairs of adjacent vertices u and v with p u + p v < w(uv). By pinpointing a relationship to the accessibility of the coalition structure core of matching games, we give a simple constructive proof for showing that every yes-instance of the stable roommates problem with payments allows a path of linear length that starts in an arbitrary unstable solution and that ends in a stable solution. This result generalizes a result of Chen, Fujishige and Yang for bipartite instances to general instances. We also show that the problems Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value, which are to find a solution with a minimum number of blocking pairs or a minimum total blocking value, respectively, are NP-hard. Finally, we prove that the variant of the first problem, in which the number of blocking pairs must be minimized with respect to some fixed matching, is NP-hard, whereas this variant of the second problem is polynomial-time solvable.
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Biró, P., Bomhoff, M., Golovach, P.A., Kern, W., Paulusma, D. (2012). Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments. In: Golumbic, M.C., Stern, M., Levy, A., Morgenstern, G. (eds) Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science. WG 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7551. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34611-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34611-8_10
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