Abstract
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks from a large number of compromised mobile devices are a major threat to mobile networks. In this paper, we present a concept, an architecture, and a protocol for a hardware-based attestation which enables mobile devices to efficiently prove that their baseband stack is still trustworthy. Our attestation mechanism enables verification of the baseband stack without using expensive asymmetric cryptographic operations, maintains the ability to update (or recover) the baseband binary, and allows the network to enforce a certain version, state, or configuration of the baseband at network connect. Our approach represents an efficient method to block devices with a compromised baseband stack and thus prevents distributed denial of service attacks to mobile networks.
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Wagner, S., Wessel, S., Stumpf, F. (2012). Attestation of Mobile Baseband Stacks. In: Xu, L., Bertino, E., Mu, Y. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7645. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34601-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34601-9_3
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