Motivating Retail Marketing Efforts under Fairness Concerns in Small-World Networks: A Multi-agent Simulation

  • Meng Qingfeng
  • Du Jianguo
  • Li Zhen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7665)


When manufacturer motivates retailer groups to increase sales efforts with a linear transfer payment contract, we assume that retailers concern about fairness and the channel structure which retailer access to information corresponds to the small-world network, and built a multi-agent model to mainly observe the impact of small-world network characteristics on the incentive effects. Experimental results show that the greater probability of replacement objects, the lower manufacturer’s profit and products sales. The retailer gets very small amount of other retailers related information will have a huge negative impact on incentive effects, if the number of objects in comparison achieves a certain number, the manufacturers profit and products sales will not be affected to a large extent.


Sales Efforts Linear Transfer Payment Contract Fairness Preference Small-world Network Multi-agent Simulation 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Meng Qingfeng
    • 1
  • Du Jianguo
    • 1
  • Li Zhen
    • 2
  1. 1.School of ManagementJiangsu UniversityZhenjiangChina
  2. 2.School of Economics and ManagementJiangsu University of Science and TechnologyZhenjiangChina

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