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Are We Compromised? Modelling Security Assessment Games

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7638))

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Abstract

Security assessments are an integral part of organisations’ strategies for protecting their digital assets and critical IT infrastructure. In this paper we propose a game-theoretic modelling of a particular form of security assessment – one which addresses the question “are we compromised?”. We do so by extending the recently proposed game “FlipIt”, which itself can be used to model the interaction between defenders and attackers under the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) scenario. Our extension gives players the option to “test” the state of the game before making a move. This allows one to study the scenario in which organisations have the option to perform periodic security assessments of such nature, and the benefits they may bring.

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Pham, V., Cid, C. (2012). Are We Compromised? Modelling Security Assessment Games. In: Grossklags, J., Walrand, J. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7638. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34265-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34266-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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