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A Game-Theoretic Framework for Network Security Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation

  • Assane Gueye
  • Vladimir Marbukh
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7638)

Abstract

In this paper we propose and discuss a game-theoretic framework for (a) evaluating security vulnerability, (b) quantifying the corresponding Pareto optimal vulnerability/cost tradeoff, and (c) identifying the optimal operating point on this Pareto optimal frontier. We discuss our framework in the context of a flow-level model of Supply-Demand (S-D) network where we assume a sophisticated attacker attempting to disrupt the network flow. The vulnerability metric is determined by the Nash equilibrium payoff of the corresponding game. The vulnerability/cost tradeoff is derived by assuming that “the network” can reduce the security vulnerability at the cost of using more expensive flows and the optimal operating point is determined by “the network” preferences with respect to vulnerability and cost. We illustrate the proposed framework on examples through numerical investigations.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Network Manager Maximum Cost Security Investment Security Vulnerability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Assane Gueye
    • 1
  • Vladimir Marbukh
    • 1
  1. 1.National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)USA

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