Polynomial-Advantage Cryptanalysis of 3D Cipher and 3D-Based Hash Function

  • Lei Wang
  • Yu Sasaki
  • Kazuo Sakiyama
  • Kazuo Ohta
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7631)

Abstract

This paper evaluates a block cipher mode, whose round functions of both the key schedule and the encryption process are independent of the round indexes. Previously related-key attack has been applied to such block cipher mode, and it can work no matter how many rounds are iterated in the cipher. This paper presents an accelerated key-recovery attack on this block cipher mode in the single-key setting. Similarly, our attack can also work no matter how many rounds are iterated in the cipher. More interestingly, the effectiveness of our attack, e.g. the relative advantage, increases with the number of rounds.

3D is a dedicated block cipher following the target mode. We apply the key-recovery attack to 3D cipher, and extend it to collision and preimage attacks on 3D-based hash functions. For a l-round instance of 3D (l is recommended as 22 by the designer), the complexity of recovering the secret key is \(2^{512}/\sqrt{l/2}\) data, \(2^{512}/\sqrt{l/2}\) offline computation, and \(2^{512}/\sqrt{l/2}\) memory requirement. And the success probability is 0.63. Thus compared with the brute-force attack, the complexity is accelerated by a factor of \(0.315*\sqrt{l/2}\) in the sense of total computations (including both online and offline computations) under the same success probability 0.63. The total computations of finding collision and preimage on 3D-based hash functions are 2257/l and 2513/l, namely accelerated by a factor of l/2 in the sense of total computations under the same success probability. Moreover, differently from the key-recovery attack, the collision and preimage attacks don’t need to increase the memory requirement compared with the brute-force attack.

Finally we stress that all our attacks are polynomial-advantage attacks.

Keywords

3D key-recovery collision preimage polynomial-advantage 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lei Wang
    • 1
  • Yu Sasaki
    • 2
  • Kazuo Sakiyama
    • 1
  • Kazuo Ohta
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of Electro-CommunicationsChoufu-shiJapan
  2. 2.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesNTT CorporationMusashino-shiJapan

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