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International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption

FSE 2012: Fast Software Encryption pp 90–109Cite as

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New Observations on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia

New Observations on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia

  • Ya Liu17,
  • Leibo Li18,19,
  • Dawu Gu17,
  • Xiaoyun Wang18,19,20,
  • Zhiqiang Liu17,
  • Jiazhe Chen18,19 &
  • …
  • Wei Li21,22,23 
  • Conference paper
  • 2047 Accesses

  • 11 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7549)

Abstract

Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, by exploiting some interesting properties of the key-dependent layer, we improve previous results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia and gain some new observations. First, we introduce some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys. These weak keys that work for the impossible differential take 3/4 of the whole key space, therefore, we further get rid of the weak-key assumption and leverage the attacks on reduced-round Camellia to all keys by utilizing the multiplied method. Second, we build a set of differentials which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two FL/FL− 1 layers. Following this new result, we show that the key-dependent transformations inserted in Camellia cannot resist impossible differential cryptanalysis effectively. Based on this set of differentials, we present a new cryptanalytic strategy to mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia.

Keywords

  • Block Cipher
  • Camellia
  • Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, China

    Ya Liu, Dawu Gu & Zhiqiang Liu

  2. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Leibo Li, Xiaoyun Wang & Jiazhe Chen

  3. School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Leibo Li, Xiaoyun Wang & Jiazhe Chen

  4. Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China

    Xiaoyun Wang

  5. School of Computer Science and Technology, Donghua University, Shanghai, 201620, China

    Wei Li

  6. Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrate Administration Technologies for Information Security, Shanghai, 200240, China

    Wei Li

  7. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China

    Wei Li

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  1. Ya Liu
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  7. Wei Li
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt, B.P. 105, 78153, Le Chesnay, France

    Anne Canteaut

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Liu, Y. et al. (2012). New Observations on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia. In: Canteaut, A. (eds) Fast Software Encryption. FSE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7549. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34047-5_6

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