Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games

  • K. Ruben Brokkelkamp
  • Mees J. de Vries
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7615)


We consider generalized congestion games, a class of games in which players share a set of strategies and the payoff functions depend only on the chosen strategy and the number of players playing the same strategy, in such a way that fewer such players results in greater payoff. In these games we consider improvement paths. As shown by Milchtaich [2] such paths may be infinite. We consider paths in which the players deviate in a specific order, and prove that ordered best response improvement paths are finite, while ordered better response improvement paths may still be infinite.


Nash Rium 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. Ruben Brokkelkamp
    • 1
  • Mees J. de Vries
    • 1
  1. 1.Korteweg–de Vries InstituteUniversity of AmsterdamNetherlands

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