Abstract
We consider generalized congestion games, a class of games in which players share a set of strategies and the payoff functions depend only on the chosen strategy and the number of players playing the same strategy, in such a way that fewer such players results in greater payoff. In these games we consider improvement paths. As shown by Milchtaich [2] such paths may be infinite. We consider paths in which the players deviate in a specific order, and prove that ordered best response improvement paths are finite, while ordered better response improvement paths may still be infinite.
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Brokkelkamp, K.R., de Vries, M.J. (2012). Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games. In: Serna, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7615. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_6
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