Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values

  • Vincenzo Auletta
  • George Christodoulou
  • Paolo Penna
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7615)

Abstract

We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], we study a setting with restrictions on the domain, while still preserving multi-dimensionality. In a sense, our setting is the simplest multi-dimensional setting, where each machine holds privately only a single-bit of information.

We prove a separation between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization: We first show how to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and then prove lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of universally truthful mechanisms.

Keywords

Nism 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincenzo Auletta
    • 1
  • George Christodoulou
    • 2
  • Paolo Penna
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di SalernoItaly
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of LiverpoolUnited Kingdom

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