A Lightweight Methodology for Safety Case Assembly

  • Ewen Denney
  • Ganesh Pai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7612)

Abstract

We describe a lightweight methodology to support the automatic assembly of safety cases from tabular requirements specifications. The resulting safety case fragments provide an alternative, graphical, view of the requirements. The safety cases can be modified and augmented with additional information. In turn, these modifications can be mapped back to extensions of the tabular requirements, with which they are kept consistent, thus avoiding the need for engineers to maintain an additional artifact. We formulate our approach on top of an idealized process, and illustrate the applicability of the methodology on excerpts of requirements specifications for an experimental Unmanned Aircraft System.

Keywords

Safety cases Formal methods Automation Requirements Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ewen Denney
    • 1
  • Ganesh Pai
    • 1
  1. 1.SGT / NASA Ames Research CenterMoffett FieldUSA

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