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A New Scheme with Secure Cookie against SSLStrip Attack

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 7529))

Abstract

In 2009 Moxie Marlinspike proposed a new Man-in-the- Middle (MitM) attack on secure socket layer (SSL) called SSLStrip attack at Black Hat DC, which is a serious threat to Web users. Some solutions have been proposed in literature. However, until now there is no practical countermeasure to resist on such attack. In this paper, we propose a new scheme to defend against SSLStrip attack by improving the previous secure cookie protocols and using proxy pattern and reverse proxy pattern. It implements a secure LAN guaranteed proxy in client-side, a secure server guaranteed proxy in server-side and a cookie authentication mechanism to provide the following security services: source authentication, integrity control and defending SSLStrip attack.

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References

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Zhao, S., Yang, W., Wang, D., Qiu, W. (2012). A New Scheme with Secure Cookie against SSLStrip Attack. In: Wang, F.L., Lei, J., Gong, Z., Luo, X. (eds) Web Information Systems and Mining. WISM 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7529. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33469-6_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33469-6_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33468-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33469-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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