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European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

ESORICS 2012: Computer Security – ESORICS 2012 pp 73–90Cite as

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Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions

Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions

  • Serdar Erbatur19,
  • Santiago Escobar20,
  • Deepak Kapur21,
  • Zhiqiang Liu22,
  • Christopher Lynch22,
  • Catherine Meadows23,
  • José Meseguer24,
  • Paliath Narendran19,
  • Sonia Santiago20 &
  • …
  • Ralf Sasse24 
  • Conference paper
  • 3495 Accesses

  • 10 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7459)

Abstract

We address a problem that arises in cryptographic protocol analysis when the equational properties of the cryptosystem are taken into account: in many situations it is necessary to guarantee that certain terms generated during a state exploration are in normal form with respect to the equational theory. We give a tool-independent methodology for state exploration, based on unification and narrowing, that generates states that obey these irreducibility constraints, called contextual symbolic reachability analysis, prove its soundness and completeness, and describe its implementation in the Maude-NPA protocol analysis tool. Contextual symbolic reachability analysis also introduces a new type of unification mechanism, which we call asymmetric unification, in which any solution must leave the right side of the solution irreducible. We also present experiments showing the effectiveness of our methodology.

Keywords

  • Equational Theory
  • Security Protocol
  • State Exploration
  • Reachability Analysis
  • State Space Reduction

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

S. Escobar and S. Santiago have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MEC/MICINN under grant TIN 2010-21062-C02-02, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. The following authors have been partially supported by NSF: S. Escobar, J. Meseguer and R. Sasse under grants CCF 09-05584, CNS 09-04749, and CNS 09-05584; D. Kapur under grant CNS 09-05222; C. Lynch, Z. Liu, and C. Meadows under grant CNS 09-05378, and P. Narendran and S. Erbatur under grant CNS 09-05286.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, NY, USA

    Serdar Erbatur & Paliath Narendran

  2. DSIC-ELP, Universitat Politècnica de València, Spain

    Santiago Escobar & Sonia Santiago

  3. University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

    Deepak Kapur

  4. Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY, USA

    Zhiqiang Liu & Christopher Lynch

  5. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA

    Catherine Meadows

  6. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

    José Meseguer & Ralf Sasse

Authors
  1. Serdar Erbatur
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  2. Santiago Escobar
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  3. Deepak Kapur
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  4. Zhiqiang Liu
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  5. Christopher Lynch
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  6. Catherine Meadows
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  7. José Meseguer
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  8. Paliath Narendran
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  9. Sonia Santiago
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  10. Ralf Sasse
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Bramante 65, 26013, Crema, Italy

    Sara Foresti

  2. Computer Science Department, Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, 10025, New York, NY, US

    Moti Yung

  3. Institute of Informatics and Telematics, Information Security Group, National Research Council, Pisa Research Area, Via G. Moruzzi 1, 56125, Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Erbatur, S. et al. (2012). Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions. In: Foresti, S., Yung, M., Martinelli, F. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2012. ESORICS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7459. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5

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