Equivalent Inner Key Recovery Attack to NMAC

Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 189)

Abstract

We propose a general equivalent inner key recovery attack to the NMAC (Nested Message Authentication Code) instantiated with secure hash function in a related key setting, by applying a generalized birthday attack with two groups. We can recover the equivalent inner key of NMAC in about 2 n/2 + 1 on-line MAC queries. The assumption of that the underlying hash function must be collision resistant is dropped in the security proof of NMAC. However, our result shows that NMAC, even instantiated with a collision resistant Merkle-Damgård hash function, is not secure as its designer claimed.

Keywords

NMAC Equivalent Key Recovery Verifiable Forgery Birthday Attack 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of ComputerNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaP.R. China
  2. 2.School of ComputerBeijing University of TechnologyBeijingP.R. China
  3. 3.The Center for Soft-Computing and CryptologyNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaP.R. China

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