How Political Illusions Harm National Stability: Fiscal Illusion as a Source of Taxation
Fiscal illusion is the most common form of political illusions. This article introduces an agent-based model developed for testing the Fasiani model of fiscal illusion. The Fasiani model introduces fiscal illusion as a source of extra taxation that can lead to an impoverishment of citizens and to null national production after a several periods of increasing levels of fiscal illusion. We modeled this strategy as a “dictator game,” in which we show that a state that constantly deceives its citizens is a source of national instability, deeply harming its national security.
KeywordsFiscal Illusion Taxation Taxes Programs Codes
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