How Political Illusions Harm National Stability: Fiscal Illusion as a Source of Taxation

  • Paulo Mourao
  • José Pedro Cabral
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 189)

Abstract

Fiscal illusion is the most common form of political illusions. This article introduces an agent-based model developed for testing the Fasiani model of fiscal illusion. The Fasiani model introduces fiscal illusion as a source of extra taxation that can lead to an impoverishment of citizens and to null national production after a several periods of increasing levels of fiscal illusion. We modeled this strategy as a “dictator game,” in which we show that a state that constantly deceives its citizens is a source of national instability, deeply harming its national security.

Keywords

Fiscal Illusion Taxation Taxes Programs Codes 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paulo Mourao
    • 1
  • José Pedro Cabral
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics/NIPEUniversity of MinhoBragaPortugal
  2. 2.Câmara Municipal de Vila RealVila RealPortugal

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