Policies for Composed Emergencies in Support of Disaster Management

  • Barbara Carminati
  • Elena Ferrari
  • Michele Guglielmi
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7482)


Recently, some proposals have appeared to achieve timely and flexible information sharing in support of emergency management. This is obtained by means of an emergency description language able to specify both emergency situations and temporary access control policies/obligations that have to be activated during emergencies. In this paper, we show that these languages have some limitations in capturing more critical emergency situations, which might arise when atomic emergency events are combined. Moreover, we show that such critical situations might require a new response plan (i.e., new temporary access control policies and obligations), with respect to those already in place for atomic emergencies. Therefore, we introduce the concept of composed emergency and related emergency policies. We also propose some overriding strategies to determine how temporary access control policies and obligations associated with a composed emergency have to be combined with those associated with atomic emergencies. Finally, we propose a tree-data structure in support of efficient emergency policy enforcement.


Access Control Child Node Disaster Management Access Control Policy Response Plan 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Barbara Carminati
    • 1
  • Elena Ferrari
    • 1
  • Michele Guglielmi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Theoretical and Applied ScienceUniversity of InsubriaVareseItaly

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