Paperless Independently-Verifiable Voting

  • David Chaum
  • Alex Florescu
  • Mridul Nandi
  • Stefan Popoveniuc
  • Jan Rubio
  • Poorvi L. Vora
  • Filip Zagórski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7187)

Abstract

We present a new model for polling-booth voting: the voter enters the polling booth with a computational assistant which helps her verify that her vote is correctly recorded. The assistant interacts with the voting system while the voter votes on the machine in the polling booth. We present an independently-verifiable, coercion-resistant protocol based on this model. Unlike all other independently-verifiable protocols, this one is completely paperless and does not require the voter to perform any tasks outside the polling booth. We provide property definitions, rigorous claims and a description of a prototype.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Adida, B. Advances in Cryptographic Voting Systems. PhD thesis, MIT (2006)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Adida, B.: Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting. In: Usenix Security Symposium (2008)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2006)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Benaloh, J.: Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing. In: USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. In: ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (1994)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Carback, R., Chaum, D., Clark, J., Essex, A., Mayberry, T., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R.L., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.L.: Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy. In: Usenix Security Symposium (2010)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Chaum, D.: Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Security and Privacy, 38–47 (January/February 2004)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Chaum, D., Carback, R., Clark, J., Essex, A., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.L.: Scantegrity: End-to-end verifiability for optical scan elections. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security: Special Issue on Electronic Voting 4(4), 611–627 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Chaum, D., Popoveniuc, S., Vora, P.L.: eTegrity and ePunchscan. In: NIST End-to-End Voting Systems Workshop (October 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/e2evoting/documents/papers/Popoveniuc_PaperlessVoting.pdf
  10. 10.
    Even, S., Goldreich, O., Lempel, A.: A randomized protocol for signing contracts. Communications of the ACM 28(6), 637–647 (1985)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES (2005)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Chapman & Hall/CRC (2008)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Kelsey, J., Regenscheid, A., Moran, T., Chaum, D.: Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 370–387. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Neff, C. A.: Practical high certainty intent verification for encrypted votes (2004)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Popoveniuc, S., Hosp, B.: An Introduction to PunchScan. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 242–259. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Ryan, P.Y.A.: A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme. Tech. Rep. CS-TR: 864, School of Computing Science, Newcastle University (2004)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Sandler, D.R., Derr, K., Wallach, D.S.: VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2008)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Chaum
    • 1
  • Alex Florescu
    • 1
  • Mridul Nandi
    • 3
  • Stefan Popoveniuc
    • 1
  • Jan Rubio
    • 1
  • Poorvi L. Vora
    • 1
    • 2
  • Filip Zagórski
    • 1
  1. 1.The George Washington UniversityWashington D.C.USA
  2. 2.Indian Institute of TechnologyBombayIndia
  3. 3.Indian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia

Personalised recommendations